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Abstract:  
Recent research has shown that making people’s decisions known to others may enhance 
cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games with random matching. This paper 
experimentally studies whether people can cooperate with each other by endogenously showing 
their identities and building cooperative reputations when there is an option to hide the identities. 
Our experiment shows that a non-negligible fraction of subjects choose to conceal their identities 
and accordingly subjects fail to cooperate with each other in communities if hiding is cost-free. 
However, almost all subjects disclose their identities and successfully achieve cooperation if a 
cost is charged for the act of hiding. This finding has a broad methodological implication for the 
study of reputation mechanisms when infinitely repeated games are used in an experiment, as 
people’s behavior may be determined by their ability to hide identities.  
JEL classification: C73, C92, D70 
Keywords: experiment, cooperation, prisoner’s dilemma game, infinitely repeated game, 
reputation 
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Highlights 
 An infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game experiment with random matching was 
conducted. 
 Subjects decided whether to show or hide their identities (IDs) at the onset of each period. 
 Subjects’ IDs were shown to their partners if they decided to use their IDs. 
 When hiding was cost-free, some subjects hid their IDs and cooperation did not evolve.  
 When hiding involved a cost, almost all subjects showed their IDs and they achieved a high 
level of cooperation.  
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1. Introduction 
How to sustain cooperation in repeated dilemma situations is one of the most sought-after 
questions in our society. Reputations play a key role in encouraging people to cooperate in such 
environments (e.g., Mailath and Samuelson 2006). While having a good reputation can 
significantly benefit people, having a bad reputation can be a disadvantage for establishing a 
successful business or personal relationship. One needs to be identified in order to build a 
reputation so that people can link one’s past behavior and name (or one’s face, or an 
identification number if the name is unknown) to one’s future interactions. In other words, 
identity is a crucial element in building a reputation.  
A growing body of literature has explored people’s reputation-building behaviors in 
infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma environments with random matching (e.g., Camera and 
Casari 2009, Schwartz et al. 2000, Stahl 2013). Under a random matching protocol, individuals 
are randomly matched with each other from round to round, and, therefore, often kept 
anonymous to each other. Theoretically, in such infinitely repeated dilemma situations, mutual 
cooperation, in addition to mutual defection, is an equilibrium outcome under some conditions 
even if people’s identities are not revealed.1 For instance, assuming that people act according to 
the so-called contagious strategy, mutual cooperation can theoretically be sustained even if 
people are not informed of their partners’ identities or their partners’ past behaviors (Kandori 
1992, Ellison 1994). Therefore, the standard theory does not provide a point prediction about 
people’s behavior in infinitely repeated situations.  
                                                          
1
 The other well-known matching protocol is a partner matching protocol. Under the partner matching protocol, 
players are always matched with the same partners. Conditions under which cooperation evolves under partner 
matching protocols have also been actively studied (e.g., Aoyagi and Fréchette 2009, Blonski et al. 2011, Dal Bó 
2005, Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011 and 2013, Murnighan and Roth 1983). Mechanisms behind the evolution of 
cooperation for each matching protocol have also been of great interest to biologists and political scientists (e.g., 
Axelrod 2006). 
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Given the multiple equilibria in the economic theory, experimental investigations have 
been conducted in order to examine people’s strategy choices and the evolution of cooperation in 
infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games (see the survey by Dal Bó and Fréchette 
forthcoming). The results of recent experimental work provide some evidence of the evolution of 
cooperation even when a random matching protocol is used. Camera and Casari (2009) 
experimentally showed that community enforcement as proposed by Kandori (1992) may hold. 
In their “Private Information” treatment, in which subjects are randomly matched with each other 
in every period without learning their partners’ identities or past decisions, the subjects learn to 
cooperate from supergame to supergame.
2
 The literature further suggests that institutions that 
make people’s identities and past behaviors automatically known to their partners or others may 
be effective in encouraging people to achieve an equilibrium outcome of mutual cooperation 
under random matching (e.g., Camera and Casari 2009, Schwartz et al. 2000, Stahl 2013).
3
 
However, what happens if people are given an opportunity to decide whether to disclose their 
identity or to conceal it from their partners? Economists have recently started to study the effects 
of people’s collection of reputational information and gossiping on the evolution of cooperation 
(Camera and Casari 2015, Duffy et al. 2013). For instance, Camera and Casari (2015) let 
subjects play an indefinitely repeated helping game with random matching, where subjects’ 
identities were kept anonymous in the records. In one treatment, the helper subjects were given 
opportunities to purchase their partners’ history information by paying a fee before deciding 
whether to transfer a good to the partners, and in another treatment, the recipient subjects were 
given opportunities to report their counterparts’ actions by paying a fee at the end of each 
transaction. The levels of cooperation in the two treatments were similar to or lower than the 
                                                          
2
 However, subjects’ action choices seem to be sensitive to payoff matrices and continuation probabilities. Mutual 
cooperation did not evolve under a random matching protocol in Duffy and Ochs (2009). 
3
 Similar effects of reputation mechanisms have been widely found also in finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
setups (e.g., Gong and Yang 2010) as well as finitely repeated trust games (e.g., Bolton et al. 2004 and 2005). 
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level of cooperation with no history information.
4,5
  In contrast to recent research to study the 
effectiveness of such purchasing or gossiping, this paper is the first to study whether people 
attempt to build reputations by spreading information about their own behaviors through identity 
disclosure and how people’s ability to hide affects the evolution of cooperation in communities. 
This research question has realistic implications, as there are many occasions when 
hiding identities is possible in our everyday interactions. Examples include personal relationships 
in local communities. For instance, residents in a small community often know who their 
neighbors are, and they frequently interact with each other. News related to residents’ behavior 
can quickly spread across such a small, close-knit community. But do some residents attempt to 
hide their identities and behave uncooperatively? How would people’s hiding behavior change if 
hiding were costly?
6
 In contrast, even if the community size is small, some communities are less 
closely-knit (e.g., relationships among residents in some apartment complexes) and may not have 
a reputation function. In an environment with poor reputation mechanisms, do some people 
decide to hide their identities and attempt to behave uncooperatively?   
Our experiments are designed based on an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game 
with random matching, where both mutual cooperation and mutual defection hold as equilibrium 
outcomes. We use a between-subjects design. Subjects play infinitely repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma games under a single treatment condition. At the onset of the experiment, subjects are 
assigned unique identification numbers (IDs).  
                                                          
4
 We note that the impact of collection of reputational information may depend on games and/or subject pools. In 
Duffy et al. (2013), subjects were provided with information on partners’ past decisions for free or were given 
opportunities to purchase such information for a small fee in an infinitely repeated trust game. The data indicated 
that in both of the situations, not only trust but also reciprocity was enhanced, compared to a treatment without the 
partners’ history information.  
5
 In a simple one-shot experiment, Kamei and Putterman (forthcoming) found that acts of gossiping were more 
likely to be made by those who are exploited by defectors. 
6
 In large-scale economies, such as online platforms, information does not automatically spread among communities, 
and people instead incur cost (e.g., time) to disseminate information (e.g., by updating their profile). This situation 
can be modeled by assuming that people incur some cost to build public reputations; this has recently been studied 
in a different setup by Kamei (2016).  
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This paper consists of two sets of experiments based on the same framework. The first set 
consists of three No-Choice treatments with different quantities of information made available to 
subjects. In one treatment, each subject is not informed of either their matched partner’s ID or 
their past actions (cooperation or defection). In the second treatment, each subject is informed of 
their matched partner’s ID and their past actions chosen against the subject in each round. Thus, 
each subject can keep track of their own experience with a specific partner. In the third treatment, 
each subject is informed of actions chosen by all group members, including members that are not 
their partners, along with their IDs. In the three No-Choice treatments, we ask: Do subjects’ 
levels of cooperation increase as the quantity of reputational information increases?  
The second set consists of four Choice treatments. In these Choice treatments, subjects 
decide whether to disclose or hide their IDs before the interactions begin in each period. When 
subject i hides her ID in period t, her period t partner is informed only that he is interacting with 
a randomly assigned player in his group. After i’s interaction with the partner ends, the action 
choice of i will not be recorded, and it will not be available to anyone in any future periods. By 
contrast, when subject i discloses her ID in period t, her matched partner is informed of i’s ID 
before choosing an action in that period, and i’s action choice will also be recorded.  
The four Choice treatments differ in two aspects. The first aspect is the amount of 
information made available to subjects. Specifically, we vary what past recorded action choices 
of a partner subject i can see when the partner reveals his ID: either those that were made against 
i only, or all of his past recorded actions in a given supergame. The second aspect is whether 
hiding the ID is free or costly. Thus, this part of our design is a 2  2 design. With the four 
Choice treatments, we address the following specific questions: Does being able to hide one’s 
identity hurt cooperation? What happens if there is a cost for hiding the identity? 
First, our experiment shows that increasing the quantity of information along with 
(automatically) revealing their IDs has positive effects on subjects’ cooperation rates. Second, 
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we find that having a free option to hide IDs significantly lessens subjects’ cooperative behavior, 
especially when the subjects’ IDs and action choices can be observed only by their matched 
partners. By sharp contrast, when subjects incur a cost for hiding, almost all the subjects choose 
to reveal their IDs and achieve a high level of cooperation. The average cooperation rates in the 
costly hiding treatments are significantly higher than those in the free hiding treatments, and are 
not significantly different from the high cooperation rates of the corresponding No-Choice 
treatments.  
This paper offers two main contributions. First and most importantly, we provide the first 
experimental evidence that the level of cooperation may be significantly affected by a person’s 
ability to hide. Second, we show that costly hiding mechanisms may be effective in preventing 
people from hiding their IDs and then selecting defection.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our experimental design. 
Section 3 provides theoretical considerations and discusses subjects’ possible behaviors. Section 
4 reports our results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Experimental Design 
The design framework of our study is an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. At 
the beginning of the experiment, each subject is assigned a unique identification number (ID). 
Our experiment consists of (i) three No-Choice treatments and (ii) four Choice treatments (see 
Table 1). The seven treatments are varied by (a) whether or not disclosing IDs involves subjects’ 
decisions, (b) which member in a group learns the action choices (cooperate or defect) of those 
who have decided to disclose their IDs, and (c) whether a subject pays a cost to hide the assigned 
ID.  Our design is based on the framework employed by Camera and Casari (2009), explained in 
Subsection 2.1. Two of the three No-Choice treatments are from their study. We add one new 
treatment as the third No-Choice treatment. We then set up four new treatments with choices.  
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2.1. Common Features in All Treatments  
Subjects play five infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. We call an “infinitely 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma game” also a “supergame” in this paper. Subjects are randomly 
assigned to a group of four at the beginning of each supergame. The list of the four members’ 
IDs is common knowledge in the group. Group assignment across the supergames follows a 
perfect stranger matching protocol. That is, once a supergame is over, subjects are randomly 
assigned to another group of four in the following supergame. No one has the same person as a 
group member in more than one supergame. Any information from a given supergame is not 
carried over to a future supergame.  
Within a supergame, each subject is randomly paired with a group member in every 
period.
7
 Subjects do not interact with subjects outside their groups within a supergame. Neither 
their decisions nor their interaction outcomes in the past affect the matching process. The 
duration of each supergame is not pre-determined. Subjects’ interactions will be over (continue) 
with a probability of 5% (95%).
8
  Thus, the expected length of each supergame is 20 (= 
1/(1−.95)). The payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma game is shown in Figure 1.  
2.2. The Three No-Choice Treatments  
In the “No Information” treatment, abbreviated as the N treatment, the IDs of subjects are 
not disclosed to their partners or anyone in the groups in each period. Subjects just know that 
they are randomly matched with one of the three group members when they choose an action. 
They learn their own pair’s interaction results (the action choices of the matched partners and 
their payoffs) at the end of each period, without learning their partners’ IDs.  
                                                          
7
 Since group size is four, the probability that a subject will interact with a specific member in a given period is 1/3. 
8
 We can interpret that risk-neutral subjects have a discounting factor of .95 with this setup. 
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In the “Reputation within Group” treatment (the RG treatment), each subject is informed 
of their matched counterpart’s ID when choosing an action in every period.9 They are at the same 
time informed of all the past actions chosen by each of the three group members within a given 
supergame. At the end of each period, subjects learn the action choices of the three members, 
including those who are not matched with them.
10
  
The last No-Choice treatment is called the “Reputation with Partner” treatment (the RP 
treatment). In the RP treatment, as in the RG treatment, each subject is informed of their matched 
counterpart’s ID before choosing an action. They are also given the records of their interaction 
outcomes (i.e., actions chosen by the own partners in the past). However, subjects are not 
informed of any interaction outcomes of other players (i.e., actions chosen by those who have not 
been matched with them), unlike the RG treatment. This treatment is conducted to examine how 
having a fixed ID observable to one’s own partners alone, without feedback systems, affects 
cooperation norms in the community.
11
  
2.3. The Four Choice Treatments  
We design two sets of two Choice treatments. In these Choice treatments, before 
engaging in an interaction, each subject can choose either to use their ID or to hide it so that the 
matched partner will not know with whom he is interacting. The two sets of Choice treatments 
are exactly the same, except the presence of a cost that a subject must pay when hiding her ID. 
In the “Reputation with Partner, Free Hiding” treatment (the RP-F treatment), subjects 
decide whether to use or hide IDs without any cost in each period. If subject i decides to use her 
ID in a period, i’s matched partner j will be informed of i’s ID before j chooses an action. In 
                                                          
9
 The N and RG treatments are the same as the “Private Information” and the “Public Monitoring (non-anonymous)” 
treatments, respectively, in Camera and Casari (2009).  
10
 Thus, subjects in the RG treatment can build cooperative reputations within their groups. 
11
 The difference in subjects’ cooperation behavior between the N and RP treatments can be attributed to the effects 
of having the fixed IDs; and the difference between the RP and RG treatments can be attributed to the effects of the 
reputation system that makes people’s decisions known to others. 
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addition, subject i’s past actions in periods where i was matched with j and i used her ID will be 
shown on j’s computer screen. By contrast, if subject i decides not to use her ID, her matched 
partner j only knows that he is playing with one of the three group members. The “Reputation 
with Partner, Costly Hiding” treatment (the RP-C treatment) is identical to the RP-F treatment, 
except that a subject incurs a cost of two points each time he conceals his ID.
12
  
In the “Reputation within Group, Free Hiding” treatment (the RG-F treatment) and the 
“Reputation within Group, Costly Hiding” treatment (the RG-C treatment), subjects decide 
whether to disclose IDs as in the RP-F and RP-C treatments. While a subject can hide his ID 
without any cost in the RG-F treatment, a subject must pay a fee of two points each time the 
subject hides her ID in the RG-C treatment. The consequence of a subject’s ID disclosure is the 
same as that in the RG treatment. Suppose that subject i decides to use her ID in period t of a 
supergame. Then, her period t partner j will be informed of the ID of subject i before j chooses 
an action. In addition, after the interaction between subject i and partner j ends, all three 
members in that group will learn the action choice of subject i along with i’s ID in that period. 
Also, the subject’s action in period t will always be available to the three group members in any 
future rounds within the supergame, along with her ID. 
2.4. Experimental Procedure  
We conducted 14 sessions (two sessions per treatment) at the University of Michigan in 
Ann Arbor from July to October in 2014. A total of 236 subjects participated in the experiment.
13
 
This experiment was computerized and programmed using ztree (Fischbacher 2007). Only 
                                                          
12
 As shown in Figure 1, the per-period gain of deviating from mutual cooperation is 5 (= 30 – 25) under the 
assumption that the others continue to select cooperation. A hiding cost of two points accounts for 40% of the 
deviation gain.  
13
 All subjects were recruited using solicitation emails sent through the University of Michigan online recruiting 
system, the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (developed by Greiner (2015)). There were 134 
female subjects (56.8% of the total subjects). The average earnings (excluding the participation fee) were $21.80. 
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neutrally-framed words were used in the instructions (see Appendix B).
14
 No subjects 
participated in more than one experimental session. No communication among the subjects was 
allowed after entering the laboratory and before the experiment ended. The instructions were 
read aloud by the researcher. Subjects were asked to answer a few control questions to check 
their understanding of the experiment before the experiment began.  
Each session consisted of either 16 subjects (four groups) or 20 subjects (five groups). 
The average duration of the experiment (including giving the payment to the subjects) was about 
two hours. The average supergame lengths were 16, 14, 20, 29, 14, 15 and 22 periods in the N, 
RP, RG, RP-F, RP-C, RG-F and RG-C treatments, respectively.  
3. Theoretical Considerations and Discussions 
A wide range of outcomes can be rationalized by standard economic theory, as we use an 
infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game as a framework. Both mutual cooperation and 
mutual defection hold as equilibrium outcomes in all treatments including the N treatment. The 
continuation probability () is .95 in our setting, and the threshold value of the continuation 
probabilities that support mutual cooperation as an equilibrium outcome in the N treatment (𝛿𝑁
∗ ) 
is equal to .443 (page 986 in Camera and Casari 2009). As discussed in Camera and Casari 
(2009), mutual cooperation is more easily attained in the RG treatment than in the N treatment if 
the grim trigger strategy is used. The threshold in the RG treatment (𝛿𝑅𝐺
∗ ) is .25. The grim 
trigger strategy also predicts that the threshold value in the RP treatment (𝛿𝑅𝑃
∗ ) is .443, the same 
as that in the N treatment. This is because subjects in the RP treatment only learn their matched 
partners’ action choices.15  
                                                          
14
 Any words with a positive or negative connotation (e.g., cooperate) were avoided.  
15
 With the grim trigger strategy, a subject chooses to defect from anyone as soon as one of the three members in her 
group chooses defection to the subject. 
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OBSERVATION 1: 𝛿𝑁
∗ = 𝛿𝑅𝑃
∗ = .443. 𝛿𝑅𝐺
∗ = .25.16 
Despite Observation 1, cooperation may be more easily sustained in the RP treatment 
than in the N treatment thanks to the availability of information on matched partners’ IDs in the 
former treatment. First, a subject’s action choice may be conditional on the matched partner’s 
observable actions in previous matches in the RP treatment, as in past research which shows 
people’s conditional cooperation behavior in other games (e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). 
The tit-for-tat-like strategy may facilitate cooperation in the RP treatment. Such direct and 
certain punishment is not possible in the N treatment. Second, IDs could serve as a coordination 
device among subjects. Subjects in the RP treatment may decide to build cooperative reputations 
with matched partners through ID disclosure.
17
  
In the four Choice treatments, the amount of information available to subjects depends on 
the other subjects’ choices regarding the use of IDs. In each of the Choice treatments, both 
mutual cooperation and mutual defection hold as equilibrium outcomes. The presence of the cost 
for hiding does not affect the threshold value of continuation probabilities . Assuming a grim 
trigger strategy, we find that the threshold value () in the RP-F and RP-C treatments is the 
same as that in the N and RP treatments.
18
 Likewise, we find that the threshold value in the RG-F 
and RG-C treatments is the same as that in the RG treatment.
19
 Therefore, theoretically the 
                                                          
16
 Past research finds that subjects are heterogeneous regarding strategy choices (e.g., Dal Bó and Fréchette 
forthcoming). There is often a non-negligible fraction of subjects who always choose defection even if mutual 
cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome in infinitely repeated games. This strategy is called the 
“always to defect” strategy. The equilibrium outcome of mutual cooperation may not be obtained in our experiment 
as well due to the presence of such subjects. 
17
 For example, Kamei and Putterman (2017) find that some subjects seek to be matched with specific persons and 
build cooperative relationships in a finitely repeated regrouping treatment, even if the only available information is 
subjects’ IDs and their own interaction outcomes.  
18
 For instance, suppose that each person s in subject i’s group chooses the following discriminating strategy: 
“always use ID, and then cooperate in a given period if (a) her partner j uses his ID in that period, and (b) s’s partner 
in any period k ∈  {1, 2, …, t -1} used his/her ID against s and selected cooperation; or defect in any other situations.” 
Also assume that subject i has also acted on this discriminating strategy so far until period t. In this situation, there is 
no better strategy for subject i than using the same strategy, and the threshold value  is calculated as . 443. 
19
 For instance, suppose that the three other members in subject i’s group choose the following strategy: “always use 
ID, and then cooperate in period t if (a) her period t matched partner uses his ID in that period, and (b) the partner 
13 
 
mutual cooperation would be equally likely to be achieved as an equilibrium outcome in the RP-
F and RP-C (RG-F and RG-C) treatments, relative to the RP (RG) treatment.
20
   
OBSERVATION 2: (i) 𝛿𝑅𝑃−𝐹
∗ = 𝛿𝑅𝑃−𝐶
∗ = .443. (ii) 𝛿𝑅𝐺−𝐹
∗ = 𝛿𝑅𝐺−𝐶
∗ = .25.  
 Observations 1 and 2, however, do not necessarily mean that the strength of cooperation 
norms in the Choice treatments is the same as that in the corresponding No-Choice treatments. 
According to the literature, there are two opposing possibilities. On the one hand, subjects’ 
cooperation behavior may be stronger if the choice to disclose or hide IDs serves as an 
opportunity for people to send signals regarding their future action choices (e.g., Tyran and Feld 
2006, Cooper et al. 1992). It is also possible that endogenous choice itself positively affects 
people’s preferences for cooperation, as has been found in other contexts (e.g., Charness et al. 
2012, Kube et al. 2012, Bartling et al. 2014, Dal Bó et al. 2010, Kamei 2016, Tyran and Feld 
2006). For example, subjects in Kamei (2016) contributed significantly more in a public goods 
game when they endogenously chose non-deterrent sanctions, whose effect was positive even if 
selection bias and signaling effects were controlled for. 
 On the other hand, it is possible that mutual cooperation may be less likely to be realized 
as an equilibrium outcome in the Choice treatments, compared with the No-Choice treatments, 
because some subjects may not have enough cognitive ability to anticipate the negative 
consequences of hiding, as recently shown in Arruñada and Casari (2016).
21
 For example, some 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and two other peers in her group have used their IDs and selected cooperation in all the past periods in the given 
supergame; or, defect in any other situations.” Also assume that subject i has acted on this discriminating strategy so 
far until period t. In this situation, subject i has no incentive to deviate from the strategy, as one instance of hiding or 
defection triggers all three members’ defection, as in the RG treatment. 
20
 As explained in footnote 12, the hiding cost is 40% of the deviation gain. Subjects’ cooperation rates in infinitely 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma games are known to be affected by stage game payoffs (e.g., Dal Bó et al. forthcoming). 
If subjects use strategies in which they hide their IDs whenever they defect, gains from defection decrease and 
accordingly the level of cooperation could increase in the costly hiding treatments. 
21
 In an indefinitely repeated modified trust game with a judge (third party enforcer) who can intervene the trustee’s 
action choice, Arruñada and Casari (2016) found that judges’ enforcement and efficiency are lower when trustees 
control judges (a treatment condition which requires high cognitive loads) than when trustors control judges or 
judges’ payoffs are determined by the aggregate income of the society (treatment conditions which require low 
cognitive loads). 
14 
 
subjects may mistakenly believe that when they hide their IDs, their partners may not select 
defection toward them. However, the partners may protect themselves from non-disclosers by 
selecting defection, and such defection could trigger a quick decline in cooperation norms as in 
the logic of the community enforcement (Kandori 1992).  
Lastly, we note that subjects’ behaviors in the RP-F and RG-F treatments may differ 
substantially from those in the RP-C and RG-C treatments if the zero cost of hiding has a 
psychological effect to increase subjects’ temptations to hide and to behave uncooperatively. 
Such a discontinuity of people’s behavior between zero and positive cost has been reported in 
another context (see Shampanier et al. 2007 and Kamei and Putterman forthcoming).  
4. Results 
 We will first discuss the subjects’ average cooperation rates in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. We 
then explore the driving forces behind the cooperation behavior in Sections 4.3 to 4.5.   
4.1. Average Cooperation Rates 
We will compare the average cooperation rates across the treatments in this section 
(Figure 2(I) and Table 2).
22
 First, the results of the No-Choice treatments reveal a significantly 
positive effect of having a larger quantity of information on subjects’ cooperation behavior. The 
average cooperation rate is higher by 29.2 percentage points when each subject’s ID can be seen 
by their partner (the RP treatment), compared with when it is not (the N treatment). This suggests 
that simply making people’s IDs available to their matched partners can be very effective in 
encouraging them to achieve high cooperation norms. The average cooperation rate is even 
higher in the RG treatment (where subjects’ IDs and action choices are shown to all group 
members) than in the RP treatment. This suggests that public monitoring, i.e., the reputation 
                                                          
22
 The average cooperation rates by experiment session can be found in Appendix Table A.1. 
15 
 
mechanism that makes people’s decisions open to the public in the RG treatment, is of further 
help in deterring people’s selection of defection.  
RESULT 1: The average cooperation rate is the highest in the RG treatment, followed by the RP 
treatment and the N treatment, in that order. 
 Second, the presence of the free ID hiding option significantly alters subjects’ 
cooperation behaviors. The average cooperation rates are 31.9 percentage points and 18.6 
percentage points lower in the RP-F and RG-F treatments than in the RP and RG treatments, 
respectively (Figure 2(I)). These decreases are significant (see variables (iii) and (v) of Table 
2).
23
 As a result, there is no significant difference in the average cooperation rate between the 
RP-F and the N treatments. The RG-F treatment still has a significantly higher cooperation rate 
than the N treatment (Part (A), Appendix Table A.2), showing a clear impact of reputation 
mechanisms even if hiding is possible. However, the average cooperation rates increase sharply 
if subjects have to bear a cost each time they hide their IDs. The data shows that the average 
cooperation rates for the RP-C and RG-C treatments are not significantly different from those in 
the RP and RG treatments, respectively (Figure 2(I), Table 2, Part (A) of Appendix Table A.2).
24
 
RESULT 2: (a) The average cooperation rates are significantly lower in the RP-F and RG-F 
treatments than in the RP and RG treatments, respectively. (b) While the average cooperation 
rate in the RP-F treatment is not significantly different from that in the N treatment, it is still 
                                                          
23
 Individual random effects linear regressions were used to study the treatment effects. Session clustering is 
included in the analysis. The reference group is subjects’ action choices in the N treatment. As for independent 
variables, first, we included the RP factor dummy and RG factor dummy in order to measure the impact of these 
factors. Second, we also added the interaction terms between these dummies and the Choice dummy (= 1 for the 
four choice treatments) to study the impact of hiding. Third, we further interacted the above interaction terms with 
the Costly hiding dummy (= 1 for the RP-C and RG-C treatments) and included them as independent variables to 
study how the cost for hiding affects subjects’ cooperation behaviors. We note that in column (2), the length of the 
previous supergame was added as a control because it can affect subjects’ action choices in the subsequent 
supergame (e.g., Engle-Warnick and Slonim 2006). 
24
 We did not find the impact of endogenous choice on boosting cooperation unlike the discussion in Section 3. A 
likely reason is that the levels of cooperation in the RP and RG treatments were already very high, and thus there 
was not much room for a further increase in cooperation in the RP-C and RG-C treatments. 
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significantly higher in the RG-F treatment than in the N treatment. (c) The average cooperation 
rates are not significantly different between the RP-C (RG-C) and RP (RG) treatments.  
 The pattern of average payoffs is similar to that of average cooperation rates (Appendix 
Figure A.1). A regression analysis confirms a qualitatively similar impact of each treatment 
factor on subjects’ per-period payoffs as in Results 1 and 2 (see Appendix Table A.3). 
4.2. Trends of Subjects’ Cooperation Behaviors over the Supergames 
Subjects’ learning behavior across the supergames differs according to the quantity of 
observable information in the No-Choice treatments (Figure 2(II)). The average cooperation rates 
in the N treatment begin at around 45% and gradually decline from supergame to supergame. In 
the RG treatment, by contrast, they are much higher from the first supergame, around 65%, and 
reach above 80% in the last three supergames. When action choices and IDs are known only to 
matched partners (the RP treatment), the average cooperation rate is similar to that in the N 
treatment in the first supergame, but the cooperation rates steadily increase from supergame to 
supergame as in the RG treatment. As shown in Table 2 and Part (B) of Appendix Table A.2, the 
increases of the average cooperation rates are significantly positive in the RP and RG treatments, 
but they are significantly negative in the N treatment. In the RP and RG treatments, the trends of 
period 1 cooperation rates over the supergames are similar to those of the average cooperation 
rates of each supergame in Figure 2(II) (see Appendix Figure A.2(a)).  
 The results of the Choice treatments indicate that the level of cooperation is much higher 
in the RG-F treatment than in the RP-F treatment in each supergame (Figure 2(II)). A larger 
percentage of subjects choose to cooperate from the onset and learn to cooperate over the 
supergames in the RG-F treatment (Panel (c)). The average cooperation rates in the RG-F 
treatment increase significantly faster from supergame to supergame, compared with the RP-F 
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treatment (Table 2, Part (C) of Appendix Table A.2). This again suggests the success of the 
reputation system in enhancing cooperation, and corresponds to Result 2(b).  
Once the hiding cost is introduced, the levels of average cooperation rates increase 
substantially in the RP environment (Panel (b) in Figure 2(II)). The average cooperation rate is 
higher by more than 30 percentage points in any supergame when hiding is costly (the RP-C 
treatment) than when hiding is cost-free (the RP-F treatment). The difference in the level of 
cooperation is significant (see variable (iv) in Table 2). In the RG environment, the overall level 
of cooperation is higher in the RG-C treatment than in the RG-F treatment by only a small 
degree, but subjects in the former treatment learn to cooperate significantly more quickly (see the 
interaction term between variable (vi) and Supergame Number variable in Table 2). As a result, 
the average cooperation rates in the RG-C treatment exceed those in the RG-F treatment in the 
last three supergames. Results of the across-supergame trends of subjects’ cooperation behaviors 
are similar even if we use cooperation rates in the first periods (Panels (b) and (c), Appendix 
Figure A.2). 
4.3. Hiding IDs and Choosing Defection 
How can we explain the differences in the average cooperation rate between the free 
hiding and costly hiding treatments? The frequency of subjects’ hiding and non-disclosers’ 
selection of defection is the key. Subjects in the RP-F treatment hide IDs about 39.5% of the 
time (Figure 3(b)). In the RG-F treatment, subjects hide IDs at a lower rate on average, about 
30.0% of the time, although the difference in the frequency of concealing IDs between the two 
treatments is not significant (Panel (2), Appendix Table A.4).
25
 In the costly hiding treatments, 
by sharp contrast, average ID hiding rates (i.e., the average percentages of cases in which 
subjects hide IDs) are only 3.3% and 2.9%, both of which are strikingly small, in the RP-C and 
                                                          
25
 Individual random effects linear regressions were used to test the differences in subjects’ hiding rate between the 
treatments. 
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RG-C treatments, respectively. These two fractions (3.3% and 2.9%) are not significantly 
different from each other (see again Table A.4). The clear difference between subjects’ hiding 
behaviors with and without the hiding cost is consistent with the idea that a zero cost of hiding 
significantly triggers subjects’ temptation to hide, and is similar to the discontinuity of people’s 
valuation of goods when engaging in purchase decisions (e.g., Shampanier et al. 2007). 
4.3.1. Subjects’ Learning to Disclose IDs 
Subjects’ learning behavior in the free hiding treatments appears to be sensitive to the 
amount of information they are given. Subjects in the RP-F treatment learn to disclose IDs over 
time by only a small degree, and the average ID hiding rate is above 30% even in the last 
supergame (Appendix Figure A.3(a)). However, in the RG-F treatment, subjects learn to disclose 
IDs to a larger degree from supergame to supergame (Appendix Figure A.3(b)), and the ID 
hiding rates drop to a little above 10% in the last two supergames. Although the difference in the 
hiding rate is not statistically significant in each supergame (Appendix Table A.4), the observed 
difference in subjects’ learning to disclose is parallel to the difference in the cooperation trend 
between the two treatments.  
Subjects’ hiding behaviors are clearly different when there is a cost for hiding. When 
hiding is costly, subjects convey IDs from the very first supergame, and the ID hiding rates 
decrease further over the supergames (Appendix Figure A.3). The ID hiding rates in the last 
three supergames are far below 5% in both the RP-C and RG-C treatments. The difference in the 
hiding rate is significant in each of the five supergames between the RP-F (RG-F) treatment and 
the RP-C (RG-C) treatment (Panel (1), Appendix Table A.4). 
RESULT 3: (i) While subjects in the RP-F treatment hide IDs more than 30% of the time in each 
supergame, subjects in the RG-F treatment learn to disclose IDs to a large degree from 
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supergame to supergame. (ii) Subjects disclose assigned IDs significantly more often in the RP-C 
and RG-C treatments than in the RP-F and RG-F treatments, respectively.  
4.3.2. Subjects’ Motives to Disclose or Hide IDs 
Among others, there are two possibilities why subjects disclose their IDs. First, subjects 
might want to signal to their peers that they are conditional cooperators, and attempt to 
encourage non-disclosers or defectors to switch to such conditional cooperative strategies. With 
this strategy, subjects could select defection even if they disclose IDs, for example when the 
matched partner is a discloser who selected defection frequently in the past. Second, subjects 
might reveal their IDs from two possible motives: (a) to build cooperative reputations by 
conveying signals of future cooperative actions, and (b) to punish members that selected 
defection in the past while letting the defectors see their IDs.
26,27
 With this possibility, subjects 
switch between motives (a) and (b), dependent on their partners’ action choices. Motive (b) is the 
punishment path with some duration. Regardless of which possibility is valid, subjects’ motive to 
convey their willingness to cooperate can be explored by using subjects’ action choices in the 
first periods of the supergames, because no punitive motives can be present in the first periods 
(recall that the perfect stranger matching protocol was used across the supergames and thus 
subjects have never seen defection from their peers in a given supergame). As shown in Figure 
4(a), disclosers cooperate much more frequently than non-disclosers in all treatments; and the 
differences in the average cooperation rate are significant for most comparisons, except the RP-C 
treatment where we do not have sufficient data because almost all subjects disclosed their IDs in 
                                                          
26
 Non-disclosers were more likely than disclosers to select defection, as will be explained in Section 4.3.3. Thus, 
motive (b) includes punishment of non-disclosers who disclosers assume would have defected in the past. 
27
 As the stage game is repeated with a high probability, some subjects may attempt to establish a reputation as a 
tough subject by making their retaliatory acts known to previous defectors with their IDs shown.  
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the first periods.
28
 This suggests that revealing the assigned ID in the first periods is a clear sign 
for a subject to select cooperation.  
The significantly higher cooperation rates of disclosers, compared to non-disclosers, 
remain the same when all data are used (Figure 4(b)). Also, the high likelihood that disclosers 
select cooperation remains at very high levels from supergame to supergame in each treatment 
(see Appendix Figure A.4). However, the average cooperation rates of disclosers are higher in 
the first periods of supergames than in other periods in the RP-F, RP-C and RG-F treatments by 
about 10 percentage points (Figures 4(a) and (b)). This may mean that some subjects in these 
treatments are using some sorts of discriminating strategies, as discussed at the beginning of this 
subsection, after the first rounds.
29
 Such discriminating strategies will be explored in details in 
Section 4.4. 
RESULT 4: (i) Disclosers in period t are significantly more likely than non-disclosers to select 
cooperation in that period. (ii) The average cooperation rate of disclosers is higher in the first 
periods than in other periods within supergames. 
In short, Result 3(ii) and Result 4(i) suggest that the high efficiency in the RP-C and RG-
C treatments (Result 2(c)) is driven by the presence of a cost for hiding that effectively 
discourages subjects from hiding and then selecting defection. 
4.3.3. Stronger Motives to Build Reputations in the RG-F treatment 
 We saw that when subjects were provided with the free option to hide IDs, the average 
cooperation rates dropped significantly, regardless of the amount of information. However, the 
cooperation rate was still higher in the RG-F than in the N treatments (Result 2(b)), despite the 
                                                          
28
 Two kinds of tests were performed: one is group-level Mann-Whitney tests, and the other is based on linear 
regressions with standard errors clustered by group id. See Appendix Table A.5 for the details. 
29
 We acknowledge that the average cooperation rates of non-disclosers are also higher in the first periods of 
supergames than in the rest of the periods (Figure 4). This may mean that non-disclosers are also employing some 
sorts of conditional cooperative strategies.  
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high overall hiding rate in the RG-F treatment. A stronger cooperation behavior in the RG-F 
treatment, compared with the RP-F or N treatment, is consistent with Observation 2: with more 
information, not only subjects are able to cooperate with specific persons more effectively, but 
also they are able to efficiently select defection in a more targeted manner. Thus, subjects’ 
incentives to select cooperation could rise. In fact, our data suggests that a mechanism which 
boosts cooperation can be disclosers’ stronger motives to build reputations, in addition to the 
subjects’ quick learning curve (Result 3(i)), as shown in this subsection.  
As explained in Section 4.3.2, disclosers’ motives to build cooperative reputations can be 
explored by using period 1 action choices. Figure 4(a) shows that disclosers’ period 1 
cooperation rates are much higher in the RG-F treatment than in the RP-F treatment, as is also 
the case when all data is used (Figure 4(b)). This holds regardless of which supergame we use for 
analysis (Appendix Figure A.4). In addition, a higher percentage of disclosers chose cooperation 
in the RG-F treatment than in the RP-F treatment, regardless of the matched partners’ action 
choices. Specifically, while about 64.5% and 36.0% of disclosers in the RP-F treatment selected 
cooperation when encountering disclosers and non-disclosers, respectively, about 97.5% and 
68.5% of disclosers in the RG-F treatment did so when interacting with disclosers and non-
disclosers, respectively (Appendix Tables A.6 and A.7). This suggests that the presence of the 
reputation system, which allows subjects to send signals to all group members, including two 
other peers in their groups (potential future partners), strengthens disclosers’ motives to build 
cooperative reputations; and this provides a specific mechanism behind the realized high 
cooperation norm in the RG-F treatment.  
RESULT 5: The period 1 average cooperation rates of disclosers are significantly higher in the 
RG-F than in the RP-F treatment, whether they encounter disclosers or non-disclosers. 
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We note that it is more difficult for a subject to effectively hide their ID in the RG-F than 
in the RP-F treatment, because there are only two pairs in each group. Despite Result 3(ii), since 
on average about 70% of subjects disclose IDs in the RG-F treatment, subjects can infer their 
partners’ IDs from publicly available information even if the partners hide their IDs.30 This 
feature of small-scale communities may drive Results 2(b), 3(i) and 5.  
4.4. Subjects’ Reactions to Partners’ Disclosure Decisions and Reputational Information  
Subjects’ strategy choices play an important role in maintaining high cooperation norms. 
Our data suggests that it is possible that the subjects adopted some discriminating strategies as 
outlined in Section 4.3.2. 
Our method to analyze the subjects’ strategy choices is to explore their dynamic action 
choices by using a regression model. We performed a regression analysis for each of (a) the RP-
F and RP-C treatments, and (b) the RG-F and RG-C treatments.
31
 The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if subject i selects cooperation in period t, and 0 otherwise, for 
each dataset. Several variables that explain the partners’ disclosure decisions and reputational 
information are included as independent variables (Table 3).
32,33
  
 First, consistent with Result 4(i), those who convey IDs select cooperation significantly 
more often than those who hide them in each of the Choice treatments (variable (i), Table 3). The 
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 When subject i is matched with a non-discloser and the two other subjects in i’s group have both disclosed their 
IDs, i can exactly infer the partner’s ID. The total numbers of subjects’ hiding events were 710 and 104 in the RG-F 
and RG-C treatments, respectively (Figure 3). Out of these events, 276 cases (38.9%) and 37 cases (35.6%) were the 
cases in which the partners of non-disclosers could infer the IDs of the non-disclosers. 
31
 Fixed effects are added to control for individual effects.  
32
 First, the “Observe-ID dummy” was included in order to examine the response of subject i to her period t partner’s 
current period disclosure decision. Second, an interaction term between the Observe-ID dummy and the “Observe-
No-History dummy” was included in order to study the response of subject i to her period t partner’s past disclosure 
decisions. Third, a variable summarizing the quality of reputational information of subject i’s partner was included 
because subject i could condition her action choice on the previous actions that her current partner chose with his ID 
revealed. Specifically, for dataset (a), we added the fraction of cases in which subject i’s unmasked interaction 
partner in period t had chosen defection toward subject i with his ID revealed before period t (variable (iv)). For 
dataset (b), we added the fraction of cases in which subject i’s unmasked partner in period t had chosen defection in 
their group with his ID revealed before period t (variable (v)). On top of these variables, the “Use-ID dummy” was 
also included as subjects’ ID using/hiding decisions were related to their subsequent action choices (Result 4(i)). 
33
 See Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) for the discussion of conditional cooperation in dilemma games. 
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disclosers’ willingness to cooperate is especially strong in the treatments with the RG factor, as 
consistent with Result 5. The costly hiding institution does not change this result (variable (vii), 
Table 3). Second, the regression indicates that subjects are more likely to select cooperation 
when they are able to see their partners’ IDs than otherwise, whether the RP or the RG factor is 
used (variable (ii), Table 3).  
RESULT 6: Regardless of whether the RP or RG factor is used, subjects are more likely to select 
cooperation in period t if their current period partners reveal their IDs in that period.  
Action choices of subjects in period t depend on their matched partners’ reputational 
information accumulated before period t. First, subject i is reluctant to select cooperation when 
her current period partner has no history information available for i even if he reveals his ID. 
This tendency is often significant (variable (iii), Table 3). Second, subjects’ choice to cooperate 
is positively correlated with the partners’ frequencies of choosing cooperation with IDs revealed 
in the past (variables (iv), (v), and (xi) in Table 3). This means that by having good recorded 
history information available to a matched partner, subject i is significantly more likely to induce 
her partner to select cooperation. These findings imply that the low cooperation rate in the free 
hiding treatments is not only due to the non-cooperative behavior of masked subjects, but also 
due to the significantly smaller quantity and significantly lower quality of recorded information, 
which causes subjects to choose defection more frequently based on the discriminating strategies. 
We have so far focused on the impact of unmasked partners’ reputational information. 
But the acts of a subject’s previous partners who hid their IDs may have also affected her action 
choice in a given period. In order to explore how experiences of interacting with masked subjects 
influence subjects’ cooperation behaviors, we conducted a supplementary regression while 
having the percentage of cases in which masked partners selected defection as an additional 
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independent variable. As shown in Appendix Table A.8, this variable turns out to be a negative 
predictor for a subject’s selection of cooperation in the RP-C and RG-C treatments.34 
 In the RG-F and RG-C treatments, each subject is informed of all group members’ ID 
disclosure decisions in each period. Thus, they are aware of the period t partner’s hiding rate (the 
percentage of cases in which the partner did not use the ID up to period t − 1). To supplement 
the analyses in Table 3, we performed a regression by including (a) the interaction term between 
the Observe-ID dummy and the hiding rate, instead of variable (iii) in Table 3, and (b) the same 
variables in Table 3 except for the change described in (a). As shown in Appendix Table A.9, the 
new interaction term obtains a significantly negative coefficient. This again suggests that less 
recorded information in a community leads to less cooperation in that community.
35
 
RESULT 7: (i) A subject is less likely to choose cooperation if there is no available history 
information about their partner. (ii) The higher fraction of cooperation her partner has in his 
recorded information, the more likely a subject is to choose cooperation. (iii) In the RG-F and 
RG-C treatments, a subject is less likely to cooperate if her counterpart frequently hid his ID in 
the past periods than otherwise. 
4.5. What Enabled Subjects to Learn to Disclose and Cooperate in the RG-F Treatment? 
 Despite the clear disadvantage of hiding shown in Results 6 and 7, the overall hiding 
rates in the free hiding treatments were more than 30%, unlike in the costly hiding treatments 
(Section 4.3). Hiding rates largely differ by subject, however. About 10% of subjects always hid 
and about 20% of subjects always disclosed IDs in both the RP-F and RG-F treatments. There 
are many subjects that do not stick to one option: either disclose or hide (Appendix Figure A.5). 
The difference in the cumulative distribution of subjects’ overall hiding rates between these two 
                                                          
34
 The same regression model as Table 3 was used. Observations in a given period of those who have never met with 
non-disclosers in the supergame were excluded in the regression. Due to the omission, the available data diminished 
48.4% (73.2%) in the RP-F and RP-C treatments (RG-F and RG-C treatments). 
35
 Results on the coefficient estimates on the Use-ID dummy, the Observe-ID dummy and the fraction of defection 
in the partner’s recorded information are similar to those in Table 3. 
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free hiding treatments is small. Nevertheless, subjects in the RG-F treatment learned to disclose 
their IDs to a large degree over time and cooperate at high levels, unlike in the RP-F treatment 
(Section 4.3). As discussed, this can be explained by Observation 2: threshold δ* is lower in the 
RG-F than in the RP-F treatment. But how did subjects in the RG-F treatment learn to disclose 
IDs and cooperate over time? We explore several possibilities in relation to this question. 
One potential reason for the difference in the subjects’ learning between the RP-F and 
RG-F treatments is that the advantage of disclosing was larger in the RG-F treatment than in the 
RP-F treatment. This possibility can be explored in two ways. First, if this is the case, subjects 
who experimented with disclosing and hiding earlier in the interactions may have learned to 
disclose more quickly in the RG-F treatment than in the RP-F treatment. However, our data does 
not support this possibility.
36
 This suggests that the subjects’ experimentation was not the most 
important factor that made non-disclosers switch to disclosing in the RG-F treatment. Second, 
the strength of non-disclosers’ responses to partners’ intentions to cooperate could be different 
between the two free hiding treatments. We saw that with the reputation device in the RG-F 
treatment, disclosers raised their levels of cooperation to build cooperative reputations (Result 5). 
Responding to the disclosers’ signals, non-disclosers may have switched to disclosing and 
building cooperative relationships more quickly in the RG-F treatment. As shown in Appendix 
Table A.13, non-disclosers in the RG-F treatment are in fact significantly more likely than non-
disclosers in the RP-F treatment to disclose IDs in period t, when the period t – 1 partners 
disclosed IDs and selected cooperation. The difference in the non-disclosers’ likelihood to select 
                                                          
36
 We sorted subjects based on hiding rates in the first supergame in an ascending order and then split them using 
quartiles in each treatment; we then studied how subjects in each of the four categories changed behaviors over time. 
Two clear results were found (Appendix Table A.10). First, while the correlation between the hiding rates in the first 
supergame and the hiding (cooperation) rates in the last supergame is significantly positive (negative) in the RP-F 
treatment, the correlations are not significant in the RG-F treatment. Second, those who always hid IDs in the first 
supergame have lower hiding rates and higher average cooperation rates in the last supergame than those who 
frequently switched between hiding and disclosing in the RG-F treatment. 
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cooperation between the two treatments is substantial (about 15 percent).
37
 This implies that 
some subjects’ experimentation behavior which had no impact on subjects’ learning to disclose 
was motivated by reasons other than finding a materially beneficial choice.
38
 
RESULT 8: Non-disclosers in the RG-F treatment are significantly more likely than non-
disclosers in the RP-F treatment to switch to disclosing IDs, when they encountered disclosers in 
the last period and the disclosers selected cooperation. 
Another possibility is that subjects in the RG-F treatment were able to imitate successful 
action choices by others, as they were informed of the outcomes of the other pairs. First, a 
subject may learn to disclose her ID in the RG-F treatment if two subjects in the other pair in her 
group disclosed IDs and achieved mutual cooperation. A regression analysis indicated that 
seeing the other pair achieve mutual cooperation raises a subject’s likelihood to disclose her ID 
by about 3 percent in the following period (see Appendix Table A.11).
39
 Second, subjects also 
have an opportunity to observe negative consequences of hiding in the RG-F treatment. Recall 
that a discloser encountering a non-discloser was more likely to select defection (Result 6). 
However, our data shows that seeing a non-discloser defected by a discloser in the other pair had 
little effect on subjects’ disclosure decisions in the following period (Appendix Table A.12).40 
                                                          
37
 We acknowledge that another possible interpretation of this result is due to higher visibility of actions in the RG-F 
than in the RP-F treatment. As explained in footnote 30, the likelihood to be identified is much higher in the RG-F 
than in the RP-F treatment, regardless of whether subjects disclose or hide IDs. The higher visibility could have 
encouraged non-disclosers to learn to disclose IDs in the RG-F treatment. 
38
 As an anonymous referee pointed out, those who frequently hide IDs may expect outcomes other than mutual 
defection. If this is the case, those who frequently switch back and forth between disclosing and hiding may play the 
game differently, compared with those who stick to one option. An analysis shown in Part (D) of Appendix Table 
A.10 indicates that regardless of hiding rate, subjects are less likely to select cooperation when they hide than when 
they disclose IDs. This result and Result 6 suggest that mutual defection is the most likely outcome when a subject 
hides her ID. This seems to suggest that some subjects may be unsure about the relative advantage between 
disclosing and hiding IDs, especially in the RP-F treatment, perhaps due to some subjects’ insufficient cognitive 
ability (e.g., Arruñada and Casari 2016). 
39
 Individual fixed effects linear regressions were used for this analysis. We note that this result is suggestive 
evidence only; the increase in subjects’ disclosure rate is significant only when session clustering is not added.  
40
 Individual fixed effects linear regressions were used in Table A.12. 
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5. Conclusions 
 This paper experimentally studied how people formed reputations when they had an 
option to hide their IDs, using an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. First, our No-
Choice treatments showed that increasing the quantity of information positively affects the 
community’s cooperation rates. Second, we found that having a free option to hide IDs 
substantially undermines cooperation. Our subjects chose to hide IDs about 30% to 40% of the 
time, and those who hid their IDs were more likely to select defection than those who disclosed 
them. In addition, subjects were reluctant to cooperate with partners who hid IDs, and therefore, 
defection spread within communities. Nevertheless, subjects in the RG-F treatment achieved 
much higher cooperation rates compared with the RP-F treatment, and learned to disclose IDs to 
a large degree over time. This suggests a clear impact of the reputation mechanism. By sharp 
contrast, when subjects incurred a cost for hiding, almost all subjects decided to disclose their 
IDs. In addition, their average cooperation rates were not significantly different from those in the 
corresponding No-Choice treatments (where subjects’ action choices were automatically 
conveyed to others). Likely channels for the strong cooperation norms with costly hiding include 
large quantity and high quality of recorded information, and disclosers’ strong cooperation 
behavior, among others. Lastly, our results suggest the importance of having a good reputation 
record if a subject wants her partner to select cooperation because subjects’ decision to cooperate 
is dependent on their partners’ recorded information.  
 Our results have a broad implication for studies of infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
games. While recent experiments have shown that infinite repetition and reputation institutions 
can encourage people to choose a cooperation equilibrium with community enforcement, to our 
knowledge, the question of whether they can achieve a high level of cooperation by disclosing 
their own IDs remained an open question. Our results clearly suggest that the answer to this 
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question may depend on people’s ability to hide IDs and also on the cost of hiding. This also has 
a meaningful implication for studies of reputation mechanisms. With the recent advancement of 
experimental methodology, infinitely repeated setups are increasingly used in studies of the 
evolution of cooperation or reputation mechanisms. Our findings suggest that the effectiveness 
of reputation mechanisms may be affected by how basic rules of games are set (endogenously or 
exogenously).  
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Figure 1: Payoff Matrix of the Stage Game 
Subject 2 
 C (cooperate) D (defect) 
C 25, 25 5, 30 
D 30, 5 10, 10 
 
Note: This payoff matrix is from Camera and Casari (2009).  
   
Subject 1 
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Table 1: Summary of Treatments 
      
Treatment name Subject identification 
numbers in period t 
interactions 
Cost of  
hiding ID 
Available history information on  
period t partner before subject i  
chooses an action in period t 
Who learns the action choice of 
subject i in period t at the end of 
the period 
Threshold δ that 
makes mutual 
cooperation an 
equilibrium outcome 
      
      
I. No-Choice Treatments:      
N (No Information) Not available n.a. n.a. 
Period t matched partner learns 
without i’s ID 
.443 
RP (Reputation with 
Partner) A subject’s ID is 
automatically 
disclosed to period t 
matched partner 
n.a. 
Period t partner’s action choices 
in past periods where he was 
matched with subject i 
Period t matched partner learns 
along with i’s ID 
.443 
RG (Reputation within 
Group) 
n.a. 
Period t partner’s action choices in 
all past periods up to period t – 1 in 
a given supergame 
All group members learn 
along with i’s ID 
.250 
II. Choice Treatments:      
RP-F (Reputation with 
Partner, Free Hiding) 
A subject’s ID is 
disclosed to period t 
matched partner if the 
subject chooses to use 
her ID in period t 
0 points Period t partner’s action choices 
in past periods in which he was 
matched with subject i and used 
his ID 
Period t matched partner learns 
along with i’s ID (without i’s 
ID) if i uses (hides) her 
assigned ID in period t 
.443 
RP-C (Reputation with 
Partner, Costly Hiding) 
2 points .443 
RG-F (Reputation within 
Group, Free Hiding) 
0 points 
Period t partner’s action choices 
in past periods in which he used 
his ID in a given supergame 
All three group members learn 
along with i’s ID (Only period t 
matched partner learns without 
i’s ID) if i uses (hides) her 
assigned ID in period t 
.250 
RG-C (Reputation within 
Group, Costly Hiding) 
2 points .250 
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Figure 2: Average Cooperation Rate by Treatment   
 
 
(I) Average Cooperation Rates across All Supergames 
Notes: In the Choice treatments with the RP factor, when subject i uses her ID in period t, her partner j learns i’s 
previous action choices in periods where j was matched with i and subject i used her ID. In the Choice treatments 
with the RG factor, when subject i uses her ID in period t interaction, her partner j learns the previous action choices 
of subject i in all periods where i used her ID in a given supergame. See Table 2 for the impact of each treatment 
factor on the average cooperation rate.  
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(II) Average Cooperation Rates by Supergame 
 
Notes: In order to calculate the average cooperation rate (each point in the figures) in a given supergame, we first calculated each subject’s average cooperation 
rate across all periods in that supergame. We then averaged them across all subjects in that treatment. In other words, it is: 
1
𝑁
∑ [
1
𝑇𝑃
∑ 𝑐𝑡𝑖
𝑝
𝑡 ]𝑖 , where 𝑐𝑡𝑖
𝑝
 = 1 if subject 
i selected cooperation in period t of supergame p, and 0 if subject i selected defection, N is the number of subjects in a given treatment, p is the supergame 
number ({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}), 𝑇𝑃 is the total number of realized periods in supergame p, and t  {1, 2, …, 𝑇𝑃}. As for the statistical tests of the dynamics of the 
average cooperation rates, see Table 2 of the paper and Table A.2 of the online Appendix.  
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Table 2: The Effects of Each Treatment Factor on the Average Cooperation Rate  
Dependent Variable: A dummy that equals 1 (0) if a subject chooses to cooperate (defect) in period t 
 
   
Independent Variable: (1) (2) 
   
   
(i) RP factor dummy {= 1 for the RP, RP-F and RP-
C treatments; 0 otherwise} 
.280** 
(.120) 
-.117 
(.138) 
   
(ii) RG factor dummy {= 1 for the RG, RG-F and 
RG-C treatments; 0 otherwise} 
.426*** 
(.122) 
.102 
(.110) 
   
(iii) Variable (i)  Choice dummy {= 1 for the RP-
F and RP-C treatments; 0 otherwise} 
-.319*** 
(.056) 
-.208** 
(.087) 
   
(iv) Variable (i)  Choice dummy  Costly hiding 
dummy {= 1 for the RP-C treatment; 0 otherwise} 
.370*** 
(.070) 
.252*** 
(.097) 
   
(v) Variable (ii)  Choice dummy {= 1 for the RG-
F and RG-C treatments; 0 otherwise} 
-.187*** 
(.048) 
-.286*** 
(.104) 
   
(vi) Variable (ii)  Choice dummy  Costly hiding 
dummy {= 1 for the RG-C treatment; 0 otherwise} 
.155** 
(.076) 
-.053 
(.123) 
   
Length of previous supergame  the Supergame 
Number > 1 dummy  
---- .002*** 
(.001) 
   
Supergame Number {= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} ---- -.046*** 
(.006) 
   
Variable (i)  Supergame Number ---- .119*** 
(.015) 
   
Variable (ii)  Supergame Number ---- .113*** 
  (.020) 
   
Variable (iii)  Supergame Number ---- -.046** 
  (.021) 
   
Variable (iv)  Supergame Number ---- .045* 
  (.025) 
   
Variable (v)  Supergame Number ---- .019 
(.024) 
   
Variable (vi)  Supergame Number ---- .043** 
(.017) 
   
Constant .335*** 
(.117) 
.481*** 
(.106) 
   
# of Observations 21,756 21,756 
R-Squared .130 .172 
   
 
Notes: Individual random effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session id. Random 
effects are used to control individual effects since dummy variables that measure the effects of treatment factors are 
included as regressors. The reference group is subjects’ action choices in the N treatment. The Choice dummy 
equals 1 for the RP-F, RP-C, RG-F and RG-C treatments; and 0 otherwise. The Costly hiding dummy equals 1 for 
the RP-C and RG-C treatments; and 0 otherwise. The Supergame Number > 1 dummy equals 1 for the 2
nd
 to 5
th
 
supergame; and 0 otherwise. See Appendix Table A.2 for tests comparing the coefficient estimates across the 
independent variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 
percent level, respectively.  
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Figure 3: Percentages of Subjects’ ID Usages in the Four Choice Treatments 
 
 
 
Notes: The numbers in each bar indicate the numbers of subjects’ use/hide decisions of IDs in each treatment. In the Choice treatments with the RP factor, when 
subject i uses her ID in period t, her partner j learns i’s previous action choices in periods where j was matched with i and subject i used her ID. In the Choice 
treatments with the RG factor, when subject i uses her ID in period t interaction, her partner j learns the previous action choices of subject i in all periods where i 
used her ID in a given supergame. See Table A.4 in the Appendix for test results comparing the ID hiding rates between the RP-F and RP-C treatments, and 
between the RG-F and RG-C treatments. See Figure A.3 in the Appendix for the hiding rates by supergame.  
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Figure 4: Average Cooperation Rates by ID Usage   
 
     
 
Note: Each number in a given category was calculated by computing the number of the subjects’ choices of cooperation (C) divided by the total number of action 
choices made by the subjects. In the Choice treatments with the RP factor, when subject i uses her ID in period t, her partner j learns i’s previous action choices 
in periods where j was matched with i and subject i used her ID. In the Choice treatments with the RG factor, when subject i uses her ID in period t interaction, 
her partner j learns the previous action choices of subject i in all periods where i used her ID in a given supergame. See Figure A.4 in the Appendix for the 
supergame-by-supergame cooperation rates by ID usage and by treatment. 
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Table 3: History Information and Action Choices in the Choice Treatments 
Dependent Variable: A dummy that equals 1 (0) if subject i chooses to cooperate (defect) in period t 
 
       
 No-Choice treatments The RP-F and RP-C 
treatments 
The RG-F and RG-C 
treatments RP RG 
Independent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
(i) Use-ID dummy {= 1 if subject i used her ID; 
0 otherwise} 
---- ---- 
.128** 
(.023) 
.129** 
(.032) 
.350*** 
(.047) 
.426*** 
(.019) 
       
(ii) Observe-ID dummy {= 1 if matched partner 
of subject i used his ID in period t; 0 otherwise} 
---- ---- 
.206*** 
(.046) 
.179** 
(.056) 
.281*** 
(.027) 
.329***
#4
 
(.024) 
       
(iii) Variable (ii)  Observe-No-History dummy 
{= 1 if subject i has no history information of 
her partner in period t; 0 otherwise}
#1 
-.165 
(.090) 
-.123** 
(.002) 
-.290** 
(.072) 
-.349** 
(.086) 
-.168*** 
(.024) 
-.108** 
(.023) 
       
(iv) Variable (ii)  (1 − Observe-No-History 
dummy)  Fraction of cases in which partner 
of subject i has chosen defection to subject i 
using his ID before period t 
-.665* 
(.066) 
---- 
-.539*** 
(.039) 
-.521*** 
(.038) 
---- ---- 
       
(v) Variable (ii)  (1 − Observe-No-History 
dummy)  Fraction of cases in which partner 
of subject i has chosen defection using his ID 
before period t  
---- 
-.637* 
(.090) 
---- ---- 
-.467** 
(.083) 
-.259*** 
(.022) 
       
(vi) Supergame variable {= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} .041* 
(.007) 
.017 
(.005) 
.018 
(.012) 
.007 
(.005) 
.015* 
(.006) 
.002 
(.003) 
 
      
(vii) Variable (i)  Costly hiding dummy#2 ---- ---- ---- .055 ---- -.192 
    (.033)  (.086) 
 
      
(viii) Variable (ii)  Costly hiding dummy ---- ---- ---- -.045 ---- -.183**
#4
 
    (.060)  (.045) 
       
(ix) Variable (iii)  Costly hiding dummy ---- ---- ---- .202 ---- -.038 
    (.099)  (.024) 
       
(x) Variable (iv)  Costly hiding dummy ---- ---- ---- -.098 ---- ---- 
    (.051)   
       
(xi) Variable (v)  Costly hiding dummy ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- -.324*** 
      (.036) 
       
(xii) Variable (vi)  Costly hiding dummy ---- ---- ---- .026* ---- .031** 
    (.008)  (.019) 
       
Length of previous supergame  Supergame 
Number > 1 dummy
#3
 
.000 
(.000) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.003*** 
(.000) 
.002** 
(.001) 
Constant .718** 
(.017) 
.874** 
(.017) 
.352 
(.079) 
.385** 
(.071) 
.150* 
(.062) 
.252*** 
(.014) 
       
                 # of Observations 3,264 2,656 6,800 6,800 5,936 5,936 
                       R-Squared .455 .297 .455 .480 .455 .405 
       
 
Notes: Individual fixed effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session id. 
#1
 The Observe-No-
History dummy equals 0 in period t if the partner disclosed his ID at least once to subject i before period t in the RP-F and 
RP-C treatments; and if the partner at least once disclosed his ID to a member before period t in the RG-F and RG-C 
treatments; and 1 otherwise. The Observe-No-History dummy equals 1 for any periods greater than 1 within supergames in 
the RG treatment. 
#2 
The Costly hiding dummy equals 1 for the RP-C and RG-C treatments; and 0 otherwise. 
#3 
The 
Supergame Number > 1 dummy equals 1 for the 2
nd
 to 5
th
 supergame; and 0 otherwise. #4 The null hypothesis that 
the sum of variables (ii) and (viii) is 0 is rejected according to a two-sided F test (p = .0358).  
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures 
Figure A.1: Average Per-period Payoff by Treatment 
 
Notes: The unit in the vertical axis is points (experimental currency units). In the treatments with the RP factor, when subject i uses her ID in period t, her partner j 
learns i’s previous action choices in periods where j was matched with i and subject i used her ID. In the treatments with the RG factor, when subject i uses her ID in 
period t interaction, her partner j learns the previous action choices of subject i in all periods where i used her ID in a given supergame. See Appendix Table A.3 for 
the impact of each treatment factor on the average per-period payoffs. 
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Figure A.2: Average Period 1 Cooperation Rates by Supergame and Treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Each point indicates the average cooperation rate in period 1 of a given supergame in a given treatment.   
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Figure A.3: ID Hiding Rates by Supergame and Treatment (supplementing Figure 3 of the paper)  
 
                    (a) The RP Factor: When subject i discloses her ID in             (b) The RG Factor: When subject i discloses her ID in  
                       period t, her partner j learns i’s previous action                     period t, her partner j learns the previous action choices 
                       choices in periods where j was matched with i                      of subject i in all periods where subject i used her ID 
                                  and subject i used her ID.                                                       in a given supergame. 
 
Notes: The ID hiding rates in a given supergame [%] are calculated by: (the total number of subjects’ hiding events in a given supergame)/(the total number of the ID 
hiding/using opportunities in a given supergame)100. A supergame-by-supergame comparison of the hiding rates between the choice treatments can be found in 
Appendix Table A.4.  
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%
Supergame 1 Supergame 2 Supergame 3 Supergame 4 Supergame 5
RP-F
RP-C
The % of cases in which subjects hide decisions
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%
Supergame 1 Supergame 2 Supergame 3 Supergame 4 Supergame 5
RG-F
RG-C
The % of cases in which subjects hide decisions
5 
 
Figure A.4: Supergame-by-Supergame Average Cooperation Rates by Treatment and by 
Disclosure Decision (supplementing Figure 4 of the paper) 
  
 
(I) Average Cooperation Rates in the First Periods of Supergames 
Notes: 
#1
 Very few subjects hid IDs in the first period of each supergame in the RP-C treatment (see Panel (a) of 
Figure A.3). Specifically, only one subject hid his or her ID and selected to cooperate in the first period of the fourth 
supergame; no subjects hid IDs in the first period of the third and fifth supergames.  
#2 
Very few subjects hid IDs in the first period of each supergame in the RG-C treatment (see Panel (b) of Figure 
A.3). No subjects hid IDs in the first period of the fifth supergame.  
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(II) Average Cooperation Rates when All Periods’ Data is Used   
 
REMARK: See Appendix Table A.5 for test results that compare average cooperation rates 
between when subjects used IDs and when subjects hid IDs.       
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Figure A.5: Cumulative Distribution of Subjects’ Overall Hiding Rates by Treatment 
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Table A.1: Average Cooperation Rates by Session 
The following table includes average cooperation rates by experimental session. See Figure 2 of the paper for the overall average 
cooperation rates. See Table 2 of the paper for the test results of the difference in average cooperation rate across the treatments.  
Each session contains four or five groups. In Table A.1, we omit to report data of average cooperation rates by group to conserve space 
since subjects’ behaviors could be correlated with each other within sessions. As mentioned in the paper, we included session-level 
clustering in each regression analysis of this study. 
Treatment 1
st
 Supergame 2
nd
 Supergame 3
rd
 Supergame 4
th
 Supergame 5
th
 Supergame 
 Period 1 Overall Period 1 Overall Period 1 Overall Period 1 Overall Period 1 Overall 
          
N treatment          
Avg. cooperation rate 0.525 0.467 0.450 0.393 0.500 0.392 0.500 0.326 0.600 0.385 
[breakdown by session]          
a. Session 1 0.500 0.325 (6) 0.250 0.300 (2) 0.250 0.206 (9) 0.350 0.108 (33) 0.400 0.330 (5) 
b. Session 2 0.550 0.608 (6) 0.650 0.486 (14) 0.750 0.578 (9) 0.650 0.544 (24) 0.800 0.440 (47) 
           
RP treatment         
Avg. cooperation rate 0.594 0.456 0.688 0.596 0.719 0.648 0.719 0.679 0.813 0.756 
[breakdown by session]          
c. Session 1 0.563 0.343 (29) 0.563 0.474 (24) 0.688 0.688 (2) 0.688 0.639 (80) 0.813 0.790 (22) 
d. Session 2 0.625 0.570 (8) 0.813 0.719 (8) 0.750 0.608 (18) 0.750 0.719 (4) 0.813 0.722 (9) 
           
RG treatment         
Avg. cooperation rate 0.639 0.655 0.750 0.782 0.889 0.871 0.861 0.819 0.861 0.819 
[breakdown by session]          
e. Session 1 0.600 0.625 (34) 0.800 0.832 (33) 0.950 0.918 (20) 0.900 0.875 (10) 1.000 1.000 (11) 
f. Session 2 0.688 0.692 (15) 0.688 0.719 (8) 0.813 0.813 (1) 0.813 0.750 (5) 0.688 0.594 (2) 
           
RP-F treatment         
Avg. cooperation rate 0.375 0.203 0.406 0.309 0.344 0.233 0.313 0.292 0.469 0.402 
[breakdown by session]          
g. Session 1 0.375 0.223 (7) 0.375 0.121 (17) 0.250 0.125 (7) 0.125 0.209 (79) 0.438 0.305 (55) 
h. Session 2 0.375 0.182 (36) 0.438 0.496 (32) 0.438 0.342 (15) 0.500 0.375 (20) 0.500 0.500 (19) 
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Treatment 1
st
 Supergame 2
nd
 Supergame 3
rd
 Supergame 4
th
 Supergame 5
th
 Supergame 
 Period 1 Overall Period 1 Overall Period 1 Overall Period 1 Overall Period 1 Overall 
           
RP-C treatment         
Avg. cooperation rate 0.688 0.518 0.719 0.749 0.781 0.774 0.781 0.687 0.781 0.771 
[breakdown by session]         
i. Session 1 0.750 0.719 (2) 0.875 0.875 (1) 0.813 0.813 (2) 0.750 0.715 (9) 0.750 0.729 (6) 
j. Session 2 0.625 0.318 (24) 0.563 0.622 (23) 0.750 0.735 (21) 0.813 0.658 (45) 0.813 0.813 (5) 
           
RG-F treatment         
Avg. cooperation rate 0.719 0.671 0.625 0.461 0.594 0.631 0.750 0.784 0.844 0.741 
[breakdown by session]          
k. Session 1 0.563 0.488 (5) 0.500 0.422 (4) 0.375 0.438 (58) 0.688 0.788 (5) 0.813 0.739 (23) 
l. Session 2 0.875 0.854 (3) 0.750 0.500 (31) 0.813 0.825 (5) 0.813 0.781 (4) 0.875 0.744 (10) 
           
RG-C treatment        
Avg. cooperation rate 0.563 0.531 0.500 0.449 0.750 0.736 0.844 0.844 0.906 0.903 
[breakdown by session]          
m. Session 1 0.438 0.375 (2) 0.500 0.388 (14) 0.625 0.551 (16) 0.750 0.714 (49) 0.813 0.839 (7) 
n. Session 2 0.688 0.688 (1) 0.500 0.510 (39) 0.875 0.920 (33) 0.938 0.973 (40) 1.000 0.966 (22) 
           
 
Note: The figures in parentheses are the numbers of periods realized in supergames.  
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Table A.2: Test Results concerning Table 2 of the Paper (supplementing Table 2 of the paper) 
(A) Wald Chi-Squared Tests for the coefficient estimates in column (1) 
 H0: Variable (i) = Variable (ii) 
Chi-squared =  11.01 
p-value (two-sided) = .001*** 
 
Result: The average cooperation rate in the RG treatment is significantly higher than that in the RP 
treatment. 
 
 H0: Variable (i) + Variable (iii) = 0 
Chi-squared =  .09 
p-value (two-sided) = .762 
 
Result: The average cooperation rate in the RP-F treatment is not significantly different from that 
in the N treatment. 
 
 H0: Variable (ii) + Variable (v) = 0 
Chi-squared =  3.85 
p-value (two-sided) = .050** 
 
Result: The average cooperation rate in the RG-F treatment is significantly higher than that in the 
N treatment. 
 
 H0: Variable (iii) + Variable (iv) = 0 
Chi-squared =  .85 
p-value (two-sided) = .357 
 
Result: The average cooperation rate in the RP-C treatment is not significantly different from that 
in the RP treatment. 
 
 H0: Variable (v) + Variable (vi) = 0 
Chi-squared =  .17 
p-value (two-sided) = .682 
 
Result: The average cooperation rate in the RG-C treatment is not significantly different from that 
in the RG treatment. 
 
(B) Wald Chi-Squared Tests for the trends of average cooperation rates over the supergames in the RP 
and RG treatments using the coefficient estimates in column (2) 
 H0: The Supergame Number variable + The interaction term between variable (i) and the 
Supergame number variable = 0 
Chi-squared =  17.49 
11 
 
p-value (two-sided) = .000*** 
 
Result: The average cooperation rates increase significantly from supergame to supergame in the 
RP treatment. 
 
 H0: The Supergame Number variable + The interaction term between variable (ii) and the 
Supergame number variable = 0 
Chi-squared =  12.50 
p-value (two-sided) = .000*** 
 
Result: The average cooperation rates increase significantly from supergame to supergame in the 
RG treatment. 
 
 
(C) Wald Chi-Squared Tests for the differences in the increase rate of average cooperation rates between 
the RP-F versus RG-F treatments, and also between the RP-C versus RG-C treatments 
 
     The RP-F treatment versus the RG-F treatment: 
 H0: The coefficient estimate of the supergame number variable in the RP-F treatment (The 
Supergame Number variable + the “Variable (i)  Supergame Number” variable + the “Variable 
(iii)  Supergame Number” variable) = The coefficient estimate of the supergame number variable 
in the RG-F treatment (The Supergame Number variable + the “Variable (ii)  Supergame Number” 
variable + the “Variable (v)  Supergame Number” variable)   
Using the coefficient estimates in column (2): 
The coefficient estimate of the supergame number variable in the RP-F treatment is .027. By 
contrast, the coefficient estimate of the supergame number variable in the RG-F treatment 
is .086. These two numbers are significantly different as shown below.  
 
Chi-squared =  7.36 
p-value (two-sided) =  .007*** 
 
This suggests that subjects’ learning across the supergames is stronger in the RG-F treatment than in 
the RP-F treatment. 
 
     The RP-C treatment versus the RG-C treatment: 
 H0: The coefficient estimate of the supergame number variable in the RP-C treatment (The 
Supergame Number variable + the “Variable (i)  Supergame Number” variable + the “Variable 
(iii)  Supergame Number” variable + the “Variable (iv)  Supergame Number” variable) = The 
coefficient estimate of the supergame number variable in the RG-C treatment (The Supergame 
Number variable + the “Variable (ii)  Supergame Number” variable + the “Variable (v)  
Supergame Number” variable + the “Variable (vi)  Supergame Number” variable)  
12 
 
Using the coefficient estimates in column (2): 
The coefficient estimate of the supergame number variable in the RP-C treatment is .072. By 
contrast, the coefficient estimate of the supergame number variable in the RG-C treatment is 
1.29. These two numbers are significantly different as shown below. 
 
Chi-squared =   9.97 
p-value (two-sided) =  .002*** 
This suggests that the subjects’ learning across the supergames is stronger in the RG-C treatment 
than in the RP-C treatment. 
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Table A.3: The Effects of Each Treatment Factor on the Average Payoff (supplementing 
Appendix Figure A.1 of the Appendix) 
Dependent Variable: The payoff of subject i in a given period 
 
     
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
(i) RP factor dummy {= 1 for the RP, RP-F and RP-C 
treatments; 0 otherwise} 
4.122** 
(1.799) 
4.137** 
(1.727) 
-1.688 
(2.177) 
-1.745 
(2.092) 
     
(ii) RG factor dummy {= 1 for the RG, RG-F and RG-
C treatments; 0 otherwise} 
6.373*** 
(1.832) 
6.311*** 
(1.629) 
2.121 
(1.707) 
1.579 
(1.679) 
     
(iii) Variable (i)  Choice dummy {= 1 for the RP-F 
and RP-C treatments; 0 otherwise} 
-4.765*** 
(.846) 
-5.517*** 
(1.083) 
-3.123* 
(1.647) 
-2.987** 
(1.304) 
     
(iv) Variable (i)  Choice dummy  Costly hiding 
dummy {= 1 for the RP-C treatment; 0 otherwise} 
5.404*** 
(1.06) 
6.148*** 
(1.337) 
3.600** 
(1.509) 
3.375** 
(1.373) 
     
(v) Variable (ii)  Choice dummy {= 1 for the RG-F 
and RG-C treatments; 0 otherwise} 
-2.867*** 
(.706) 
-2.458*** 
(.560) 
-4.457*** 
(1.576) 
-4.267*** 
(1.557) 
     
(vi) Variable (ii)  Choice dummy  Costly hiding 
dummy {= 1 for the RG-C treatment; 0 otherwise} 
2.299** 
(1.161) 
1.452 
(.948) 
-1.676 
(1.920) 
-1.034 
(1.899) 
     
The length of the previous supergame  the 
Supergame Number > 1 dummy  
---- .058*** 
(.020) 
---- 
 
.034*** 
(.012) 
     
Supergame Number {= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} ---- ---- -.471*** 
(.038) 
-.669*** 
(.084) 
     
Variable (i)  Supergame Number ---- ---- 1.761*** 
(.274) 
1.743 
(.223) 
     
Variable (ii)  Supergame Number ---- ---- 1.580*** 1.673*** 
   (.306) (.290) 
     
Variable (iii)  Supergame Number ---- ---- -.565** -.729** 
   (.279) (.322) 
     
Variable (iv)  Supergame Number ---- ---- .557** .753** 
   (.284) (.360) 
     
Variable (v)  Supergame Number ---- ---- .208 
(.392) 
.254 
(.365) 
     
Variable (vi)  Supergame Number ---- ---- 1.04*** 
(.250) 
.711*** 
(.262) 
     
Constant 15.090*** 
(1.756) 
14.373*** 
(1.657) 
16.865*** 
(1.683) 
17.179*** 
(1.627) 
     
# of Observations 21,756 21,756 21,756 21,756 
R-Squared .098 .113 .125 .131   
     
 
Notes: Individual random effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session id. The numbers 
in parentheses are standard errors. The reference group is subjects’ payoffs in the N treatment. The Choice dummy 
equals 1 for the RP-F, RP-C, RG-F and RG-C treatments; and 0 otherwise. The Costly hiding dummy equals 1 for 
the RP-C and RG-C treatments; and 0 otherwise. The Supergame Number > 1 dummy equals 1 for the 2
nd
 to 5
th
 
supergame; and 0 otherwise. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, 
respectively.  
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Table A.4: Subjects’ Decisions about Whether to Use or Hide IDs (supplementing Panel (b), 
Figure 3 of the paper and Figure A.3 of the online Appendix) 
(1) Testing for the Differences in the Subjects’ Hiding Rate between With versus Without Cost 
for Hiding, Supergame by Supergame 
Dependent Variable: A dummy that equals 1 (0) if a subject chooses to (not to) use her ID 
      
 1
st
 SG 2
nd
 SG 3
rd
 SG 4
th
 SG 5
th
 SG 
Independent Variable: (2) (3) (4) (5) (5) 
      
      
(i) The RG-F dummy 
{= 1 for the RG-F treatment; and 
0 otherwise} 
.139 
(.111) 
.0574 
(.120) 
.100 
(.160) 
.198 
(.121) 
.133 
(.119) 
      
(ii) The RP-C dummy 
{= 1 for the RP-C treatment; and 
0 otherwise} 
.470*** 
(.097) 
.401*** 
(.105) 
.349*** 
(.104) 
.320*** 
(.121) 
.239** 
(.119) 
      
(iii) The RG-C dummy 
{= 1 for the RG-C treatment; and 
0 otherwise} 
.352*** 
(.102) 
.356*** 
(.109) 
.316*** 
(.107) 
.328*** 
(.120) 
.245** 
(.120) 
      
      
Constant .471*** .559*** .641*** .664*** .737*** 
 (.095) (.104) (.104) (.120) (.119) 
      
# of Observations 1,280 2,576 2,512 4,016 2,352 
Wald Chi-squared 54.74 45.91 16.55 195.62 119.63 
Prob > Wald Chi-squared .000*** .000*** .001*** .000*** .000*** 
R-Squared .135 .150 .151 .272 .126 
      
Wald test results      
      
H0: (i) = (iii)      
Chi-squared 10.24 19.31 3.04 187.21 58.44 
Prob > Chi-squared .001*** .000*** .081* .000*** .000*** 
      
H0: (ii) = (iii)      
Chi-squared 8.91 1.68 1.37 1.55 .14 
Prob > Chi-squared .003*** .195 .241 .213 .711 
      
 
Notes: Individual random effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session id. The numbers 
in parentheses are standard errors. The reference group is subjects’ ID hiding/using decisions in the RP-F treatment. 
 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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(2) The Trends of the Subjects’ Disclosure Decisions over the Supergames 
 
Dependent Variable: A dummy that equals 1 (0) if a subject chooses to (not to) use her ID 
   
Independent Variable: (1) (2) 
   
   
(i) The RG-F dummy 
{= 1 for the RG-F treatment; and 0 otherwise} 
.106 
(.117) 
.023 
(.144) 
   
(ii) The RP-C dummy 
{= 1 for the RP-C treatment; and 0 otherwise} 
.356*** 
(.109) 
.529*** 
(.082) 
   
(iii) The RG-C dummy 
{= 1 for the RG-C treatment; and 0 otherwise} 
.342*** 
(.109) 
.474*** 
(.097) 
   
(iv) Supergame Number{= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} .050*** 
(.014) 
.062*** 
(.0094) 
   
(v) Variable (i)  Supergame Number 
----- 
.029 
(.023) 
   
(vi) Variable (ii)  Supergame Number 
----- 
-.052*** 
(.010) 
   
(vii) Variable (iii)  Supergame Number 
----- 
-.039*** 
(.016) 
   
The length of the previous supergame  the 
Supergame Number > 1 dummy  
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
   
Constant .451*** 
(.101) 
.408*** 
(.082) 
   
# of Observations 12,736 12,736 
R-Squared .172 .172 
   
Wald test results   
   
H0: (i) = (iii)   
Chi-squared 23.87 11.84 
Prob > Chi-squared .000*** .001*** 
   
H0: (ii) = (iii)   
Chi-squared .74 .99 
Prob > Chi-squared .390 .319 
   
H0: (iv) + (v) = 0   
Chi-squared ----- 19.69 
Prob > Chi-squared ----- .000*** 
   
H0: (iv) + (vi) = 0   
Chi-squared ----- 42.58 
Prob > Chi-squared ----- .000*** 
   
H0: (iv) + (vii) = 0 
  
Chi-squared ----- 2.96 
Prob > Chi-squared ----- .085* 
   
Notes: Individual random effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session id. The numbers 
in parentheses are standard errors. The reference group is subjects’ ID hiding/using decisions in the RP-F treatment. 
The Supergame Number > 1 dummy equals 1 for the 2
nd
 to 5
th
 supergame; and 0 otherwise. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, respectively.  
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Table A.5: Supergame-by-Supergame Tests for the Differences in the Average Cooperation Rate 
between Those Who Used the Assigned IDs versus Those Who Hid Them (supplementing 
Appendix Figure A.4)  
[Tests by means of regressions:] 
 
(1) For the First Periods within Supergames (supplementing Figure A.4(I) of the Appendix) 
 The RP-F 
treatment 
The RP-C 
treatment
#1
 
The RG-F 
treatment 
The RG-C 
treatment 
1
st
 supergame .064* .288 .082* .067* 
2
nd
 supergame .010*** .520 .031** .000*** 
3
rd
 supergame .069* n.a. .000*** .517 
4
th
 supergame .072* .019** .000*** .000*** 
5
th
 supergame .009*** n.a. .036** n.a. 
 
 
Notes: The numbers in this table are p-values (two-sided). To test the statistical difference in subjects’ cooperation 
rate between when they show their IDs and hide them in a given supergame, we conducted a linear regression with 
standard errors clustered by group id. The dependent variable is a subject’s action choice (which equals 1 if s/he 
chose to cooperate; and 0 otherwise). The independent variable is the Use-ID dummy variable (which equals 1 if 
subject i disclosed her assigned ID; and 0 otherwise). Only period 1 action choices are used for the analyses. p-
values are ones for the coefficient estimates of the Use-ID dummy variable.  
#1
 As reported in Figure A.4(I), very few subjects hid IDs in each supergame in the RP-C treatment; which makes 
each test almost not meaningful. 
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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(2) All Periods within Supergames (supplementing Figure A.4(II) of the Appendix) 
 
 The RP-F 
treatment 
The RP-C 
treatment 
The RG-F 
treatment 
The RG-C 
treatment 
1
st
 supergame .026** .001*** .004*** .070* 
2
nd
 supergame .018** .013** .000*** .001*** 
3
rd
 supergame .010*** .022** .000*** .000*** 
4
th
 supergame .000*** .005*** .000*** .042** 
5
th
 supergame .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** 
 
 
 
Notes: The numbers in this table are p-values (two-sided). To test the statistical difference in subjects’ cooperation 
rate between when they show their IDs and hide them in a given supergame, we conducted a linear regression with 
standard errors clustered by group id. The dependent variable is a subject’s action choice (which equals 1 if s/he 
chose to cooperate; and 0 otherwise). The independent variable is the Use-ID dummy variable (which equals 1 if 
subject i disclosed her assigned ID; and 0 otherwise). p-values are ones for the coefficient estimates of the Use-ID 
dummy variable.  
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, 
respectively.  
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[Tests by means of non-parametric tests:] 
To supplement the regression analysis on the previous two pages, we also performed non-
parametric tests to compare average cooperation rates between disclosers and non-disclosers.  
 
 
(1) The First Periods within Supergames (supplementing Figure A.4(I) of the Appendix) 
 
 
Procedure to compare average cooperation rates in the first periods between (a) subjects who 
used assigned IDs and (b) subjects who hid them: 
Step 1:  For each group, we computed the average cooperation rate of disclosers and the average 
cooperation rate of non-disclosers. 
Step 2: We performed a group-level Mann-Whitney test to compare period 1 cooperation 
behaviors between disclosers and non-disclosers in each supergame by treatment.  
 
 The RP-F 
treatment 
The RP-C 
treatment 
The RG-F 
treatment 
The RG-C 
treatment 
1
st
 supergame .105 .784 .184 .024** 
2
nd
 supergame .016** .682 .109 .005*** 
3
rd
 supergame .132 n.a.
#1
 .002*** .681 
4
th
 supergame .058* .301
#2
 .002*** .088* 
5
th
 supergame .004*** n.a.
#1
 .035** n.a.
#1
 
Notes: The numbers are p-values (two-sided) for Mann-Whitney tests. 
#1
 No subjects hid IDs. 
#2 
Only one subject hid his or her ID. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, 
respectively.  
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(2) All Periods within Supergames (supplementing Figure A.4(II) of the Appendix) 
 
Procedure to compare average cooperation rates between (a) the cases in which subjects used 
assigned IDs and (b) the cases in which subjects hid them: 
Step 1:  For each subject, we computed (i) the average cooperation rate when he or she used the 
assigned ID and (ii) the average cooperation rate when he or she hid it. 
Step 2:  Using the calculation results in Step 1, we computed (i) group-average cooperation rates 
when subjects used their assigned IDs and (ii) group-average cooperation rates when they hid 
them. 
Step 3: In each supergame, we performed group-level Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests to compare 
average cooperation rates between when they used IDs and when they hid IDs. 
 
 The RP-F 
treatment 
The RP-C 
treatment 
The RG-F 
treatment 
The RG-C 
treatment 
1
st
 supergame .036** .174 .019** .171 
2
nd
 supergame .401 .166 .012** .017** 
3
rd
 supergame .043** .655 .043** .095* 
4
th
 supergame .028** .782 .042** .715 
5
th
 supergame .028** .180 .092* .180 
 
Notes: The numbers are p-values (two-sided) for Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table A.6: Percentages of Disclosers or Non-Disclosers in the First Periods of Supergames in 
the Free Hiding Treatments 
 
 
a. The RP-F treatment     
     
 
Raw Players’ Matched Partners 
are Disclosers 
Raw Players’ Matched Partners are 
Non-disclosers Total 
 Raw players’ action:  Raw players’ action:  
 
cooperate defect 
 
cooperate defect 
 
 
Disclosers 37.5%   22.5%   60.0% 
   24.4% 13.1%  8.1% 14.4%  
 
Non-disclosers 22.5%   17.5%   40.0% 
   3.8% 18.8%  1.9% 15.6%  
 
Total 60.0% 
  
40.0% 
  
100.0% 
          
 
b. The RG-F treatment 
 
 
Raw players’ Matched Partners 
are Disclosers 
Raw Players’ Matched Partners are 
Non-disclosers Total 
 Raw players’ action:  Raw players’ action:  
 
cooperate defect 
 
cooperate defect 
 
 
Disclosers 47.5%   23.8%   71.3% 
   46.3% 1.3%  16.3% 7.5%  
 
Non-disclosers 5.0%   23.8%   28.8% 
   2.5% 2.5%  5.6% 18.1%  
 
Total 52.5% 
  
47.5% 
  
100.0% 
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Table A.7:  Were Disclosers in the RG-F Treatment More Likely to Choose to Cooperate in the 
First Periods of Supergames, Compared with Disclosers in the RP-F Treatment?  
 
(I) When Disclosers Encounter Disclosers 
 
Dependent Variable: A dummy that equals 1 (0) if discloser i chooses cooperation (defection) to 
her matched discloser 
 
 
   
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
   
   
The RG-F treatment dummy {= 1 for the RG-F 
treatment; = 0 for the RP-F treatment} 
.335*** 
(.038) 
.351*** 
(.055) 
   
Supergame Number {= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} --- -.010 
  (.024) 
   
The length of the previous supergame  the 
Supergame Number > 1 dummy  
--- 
.001 
(.002) 
   
Constant .643*** 
(.035) 
.648*** 
(.122) 
   
# of Observations 136 136 
R-Squared .184 .192 
   
 
Notes: Individual random effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session id. The numbers 
in parentheses are standard errors. Observations in the first rounds of supergames in the RP-F and RG-F treatments 
where disclosers were matched with disclosers are used for the analysis. The Supergame Number > 1 dummy equals 
1 for the 2
nd
 to 5
th
 supergame; and 0 otherwise. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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(II) When Disclosers Encounter Non-Disclosers 
 
Dependent Variable: A dummy that equals 1 (0) if discloser i chooses cooperation (defection) to 
her matched non-discloser 
 
 
   
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
   
   
The RG-F treatment dummy {= 1 for the RG-F 
treatment; = 0 for the RP-F treatment} 
.336*** 
(.029) 
.342*** 
(.018) 
   
Supergame Number {= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} --- -.074 
  (.045) 
   
The length of the previous supergame  the 
Supergame Number > 1 dummy  
--- 
.002 
(.001) 
   
Constant .353 
(.029) 
.526*** 
(.119) 
   
# of Observations 74 74 
R-Squared .105 .129 
   
 
Notes: Individual random effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session id. The numbers 
in parentheses are standard errors. Observations in the first rounds of supergames in the RP-F and RG-F treatments 
where disclosers were matched with non-disclosers are used for the analysis. The Supergame Number > 1 dummy 
equals 1 for the 2
nd
 to 5
th
 supergame; and 0 otherwise. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
RESULT: Regardless of whether they encounter disclosers or non-disclosers, disclosers in the 
RG-F treatment are more likely to select cooperation in the first periods of supergames, 
compared with those in the RP-F treatment. 
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Table A.8: History Information and Action Choices in the Choice Treatments (supplementing 
Table 3 of the paper) 
Table 3 of the paper reports what kinds of conditions may affect subjects’ decision to 
cooperate. Another possible factor that makes a subject select defection is his or her experiences 
about the defection by masked subjects. In the following table, the fraction of masked partners’ 
defection before a given period (see variable (vi) in the following table) was added as an 
independent variable, in addition to the independent variables included in Table 3.
1
 The number 
of available observations diminished 48.4% (73.2%) in the RP-F and RP-C treatments (RG-F 
and RG-C treatments) because observations where subjects had never interacted with non-
disclosers before a given period cannot be used in the regressions. The table below shows that 
with a greater likelihood masked subjects selected defection, the less likely the counterpart is to 
select cooperation in the RP-C and RG-C treatments (see the coefficient estimates of variable 
(xiii)). 
# Observations in a period of those who have met with non-disclosers at least once before the 
given period were used for this analysis. 
Dependent Variable: A dummy that equals 1 (0) if subject i chooses to cooperate (defect) in period t 
 
     
 The RP-F and RP-C 
treatments 
The RG-F and RG-C 
treatments 
Independent Variable: (3’) (4’) (5’) (6’) 
     
     
(i) Use-ID dummy {= 1 if subject i used her assigned ID; and 0 
otherwise} 
.069** 
(.008) 
.071** 
(.009) 
.343*** 
(.038) 
.359*** 
(.034) 
     
(ii) Observe-ID dummy {= 1 if the matched partner of subject i 
used his assigned ID in period t; and 0 otherwise} 
.151** 
(.031) 
.154** 
(.034) 
.307*** 
(.012) 
.318*** 
(.000) 
     
(iii) Variable (ii)  Observe-No-History dummy {= 1 if subject i 
has no history information of her matched partner in period t; and 
0 otherwise}
#1 
-.448** 
(.082) 
-.446** 
(.088) 
-.300* 
(.104) 
-.250*** 
(.015) 
     
(iv) Variable (ii)  (1 − Observe-No-History dummy)  The 
fraction of cases in which the matched partner of subject i has 
chosen defection to subject i using his ID before period t 
-.569** 
(.066) 
-.567*** 
(.073) 
---- ---- 
     
(v) Variable (ii)  (1 − Observe-No-History dummy)  The 
fraction of cases in which the matched partner of subject i has 
chosen defection using his ID before period t  
---- ---- 
-.350* 
(.125) 
-.243** 
(.072) 
     
(vi) The fraction of subject i’s masked partners’ defection up to 
period t -1 within a given supergame 
-.067 
(.136) 
-.045 
(.126) 
.011 
(.069) 
.035 
(.045) 
(vii) Supergame variable {= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} .016 
(.054) 
.017* 
(.006) 
-.014 
(.015) 
-.018 
(.012) 
 
    
(viii) Variable (i)  Costly hiding dummy#2 ---- -.19*** ---- -.153* 
  (.010)  (.051) 
 
    
(ix) Variable (ii)  Costly hiding dummy ---- -.127* ---- -.095* 
  (.034)  (.033) 
     
(x) Variable (iii)  Costly hiding dummy ---- .081 ---- -.179 
  (.088)  (.242) 
     
(xi) Variable (iv)  Costly hiding dummy ---- -.026 ---- ---- 
                                                          
1
 Suppose that subject i has interacted with non-disclosers three times until period 11 in a supergame. Also suppose 
that two non-disclosers chose defection out of these three encounters. In this circumstance, variable (vi) is calculated 
as .667 (= 2/3) for subject i in period 12.  
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  (.073)   
     
(xii) Variable (v)  Costly hiding dummy ---- ---- ---- -.378 
    (.345) 
     
(xiii) Variable (vi)  Costly hiding dummy 
---- 
-.614** 
(.13) 
---- 
-.950*** 
(.116) 
     
(xiv) Variable (vii)  Costly hiding dummy ---- .021*** ---- .299* 
  (.001)  (.118) 
     
The length of the previous Supergame  the Supergame Number 
> 1 dummy
#3
  
.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.003* 
(.001) 
.003* 
(.001) 
Constant .496 
(.066) 
.526** 
(.038) 
.195* 
(.113) 
.214* 
(.090) 
     
# of Observations 3,510 3,510 1,590 1,590 
R-Squared .458 .289 .4342 .364 
     
 
Notes: Individual fixed effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session id. 
#1
 The Observe-
No-History dummy equals 0 in period t if the partner disclosed his ID at least once to subject i before period t in the 
RP-F and RP-C treatments; and if the partner at least once disclosed his ID to a member before period t in the RG-F 
and RG-C treatments; and 1 otherwise. The Observe-No-History dummy equals 1 for any periods greater than 1 
within supergames in the RG treatment. 
#2 
The Costly hiding dummy equals 1 for the RP-C and RG-C treatments; 
and 0 otherwise. 
#3 
The Supergame Number > 1 dummy equals 1 for the 2
nd
 to 5
th
 supergame; and 0 otherwise.   
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table A.9: History Information and Action Choices in the RG-F and RG-C Treatments 
(supplementing Table 3 of the paper) 
 
Dependent Variable: A dummy that equals 1 (0) if subject i chooses to cooperate (defect) in period t 
 
     
Data: Action choices in periods 
when period number 
within supergames is 
equal to 1 
Action choices in periods 
when period number 
within supergames is 
greater than 1 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
(i) Use-ID dummy 
{= 1 if subject i used her assigned ID in period t; and 0 
otherwise} 
.467** 
(.146) 
.464** 
(.146) 
.339*** 
(.041) 
.406*** 
(.024) 
     
(ii) Observe-ID dummy 
{= 1 if the matched partner of subject i used his 
assigned ID in period t; and 0 otherwise} 
.138** 
(.042) 
.136** 
(.040) 
.572*** 
(.017) 
.525*** 
(.029) 
     
(iii) Variable (ii)  The hiding rate of the matched partner 
of subject i (fraction of cases in which the partner did not 
use his assigned ID before period t) 
---- ---- 
-.213*** 
(.031) 
-.268*** 
(.013) 
     
(iv) Variable (ii)  (1 − Observe-No-History dummy)  The 
fraction of cases in which the matched partner of subject i 
has chosen defection using his ID before period t 
#1
 
---- ---- 
-.520*** 
(.084) 
-.266** 
(.073) 
     
(v) Supergame Number variable {= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} .032 
(.035) 
.016 
(.020) 
.004 
(.005) 
-.009* 
(.004) 
     
(vi) The length of the previous supergame  the Supergame 
Number > 1 dummy#3 
---- 
.002 
(.002) 
.003** 
(.000) 
.002** 
(.001) 
     
(vii) Variable (i)  Costly hiding dummy
#2 ---- ---- ---- -.170 
    (.079) 
     
(viii) Variable (ii)  Costly hiding dummy ---- ---- ---- .004 
    (.030) 
     
(ix) Variable (iii)  Costly hiding dummy ---- ---- ---- .006 
    (.035) 
     
(x) Variable (iv)  Costly hiding dummy ---- ---- ---- -.346** 
    (.076) 
     
(xi) Variable (v)  Costly hiding dummy ---- ---- ---- .032 
    (.015) 
     
Constant .118 
(.077) 
.138 
(.087) 
-.069** 
(.028) 
.011 
(.021) 
     
# of Observations 320 320 5,616 5,616 
R-Squared .241 .240 .483 .510 
     
 
Notes: Individual fixed effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session id. The numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors. Observations in the RG-F and RG-C treatments were used in this analysis. 
#1
 The Observe-No-History dummy variable equals 0 in period t if the partner disclosed his ID to a member in the 
group at least once before period t; and 1 otherwise.  
#2 
The Costly hiding dummy equals 1 for the RG-C treatment; and 0 otherwise.  
#3 
The Supergame Number > 1 dummy equals 1 for the 2
nd
 to 5
th
 supergame; and 0 otherwise.   
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table A.10: Subjects’ Hiding Rates in the First Supergame and Their Behaviors in the Later 
Supergames in the Free Hiding Treatments 
 
A. Correlations between hiding rates in the 1
st
 supergame and average cooperation rates in the 
last supergame: 
 
(1) The RP-F treatment 
 Pearson’s correlation coefficient = -.474 
 p-value (two-sided) = .006*** 
(2) The RG-F treatment  
 Pearson’s correlation coefficient = -.240 
 p-value (two-sided) = .186 
 
B. Correlations between hiding rates in the 1
st
 supergame and hiding rates in the last supergame: 
 
(1) The RP-F treatment 
 Pearson’s correlation coefficient = .406 
 p-value (two-sided) = .021** 
(2) The RG-F treatment  
 Pearson’s correlation coefficient = .292 
 p-value (two-sided) = .106 
 
C. Analysis by using quartiles: 
 
We first sorted subjects based on their hiding rates in the first supergame in an ascending order; 
and then classified subjects into four categories based on quartiles (25th percentile, 50th 
percentile, 75th percentile). The tables on the next page include the subjects’ learning for each 
category. 
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(1) The RP-F treatment 
 Average hiding rate Average cooperation rate 
Classification 
based on hiding 
rates in the 1
st
 
supergame (SG) 
1
st
 SG 2
nd
 SG 3
rd
 SG 4
th
 SG 5
th
 SG 1
st
 SG 2
nd
 SG 3
rd
 SG 4
th
 SG 5
th
 SG 
Top 25% 0.003#1 0.183 0.231 0.117 0.001 0.477 0.359 0.475 0.326 0.478 
25
th
  percentile to 
50
th
 percentile 0.348 0.258 0.232 0.247 0.261 0.365 0.188 0.341 0.260 0.395 
50
th
  percentile to 
75
th
 percentile 0.756 0.595 0.475 0.522 0.337 0.149 0.220 0.151 0.143 0.103 
Bottom 25% 1.000#2 0.719 0.508 0.460 0.434 0.192 0.063 0.254 0.198 0.182 
 
(2) The RG-F treatment  
 Average hiding rate Average cooperation rate 
Classification 
based on hiding 
rates in the 1
st
 
supergame (SG) 
1
st
 SG 2
nd
 SG 3
rd
 SG 4
th
 SG 5
th
 SG 1
st
 SG 2
nd
 SG 3
rd
 SG 4
th
 SG 5
th
 SG 
Top 50%#3 0.000 0.137 0.063 0.031 0.050 0.672 0.804 0.591 0.817 0.828 
50
th
  percentile to 
75
th
 percentile 0.550 0.570 0.373 0.313 0.282 0.531 0.700 0.436 0.561 0.681 
Bottom 25% 1.000#4 0.715 0.496 0.175 0.138 0.422 0.375 0.226 0.331 0.800 
 
Notes: 
#1 
The 25
th
 percentile of supergame 1 hiding rates in the RP-F treatment is 0.0278. 
#2 
28% of subjects in the RP-F treatment have a hiding rate of 100% in the 
first supergame in the RP-F treatment. Results are similar, regardless of which subjects among those subjects are included in the bottom 25% category. The numbers 
shown in this row are calculation results in one case. 
#3  
Exactly 50% of subjects in the RG-F treatment have a hiding rate of 0% in the 1
st
 supergame in the RG-F 
treatment. 
#4 
Exactly 25% of subjects in the RG-F treatment have a hiding rate of 100% in the first supergame in the RG-F treatment.  
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D. Subjects’ average cooperation rates by disclosure decision 
 
(1) The RP-F treatment 
 Subjects whose hiding rate is 0%:  
Average cooperation rate is 52.0%. 
 Subjects whose hiding rate is 100%: 
Average cooperation rate is 1.4%. 
 Subjects whose hiding rates are between 10% and 90%: 
Average hiding rate of those subjects: 41.2%. 
Average cooperation rate when disclosing IDs: 41.2%. 
Average cooperation rate when hiding IDs: 8.3%. 
 Subjects whose hiding rates are between 25% and 75%: 
Average hiding rate of those subjects: 49.1%. 
Average cooperation rate when disclosing IDs: 31.4%. 
Average cooperation rate when hiding IDs: 6.4%. 
(2) The RG-F treatment 
  Subjects whose hiding rate is 0%:  
Average cooperation rate is 77.8%. 
 Subjects whose hiding rate is 100%: 
Average cooperation rate is 7.5%. 
 Subjects whose hiding rates are between 10% and 90%: 
Average hiding rate of those subjects: 36.5%. 
Average cooperation rate when disclosing IDs: 72.8%. 
Average cooperation rate when hiding IDs: 8.9%. 
 Subjects whose hiding rates are between 25% and 75%: 
Average hiding rate of those subjects: 48.5%. 
Average cooperation rate when disclosing IDs: 68.7%. 
Average cooperation rate when hiding IDs: 8.3%. 
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Table A.11: The Impact of Observing Mutual Cooperation in the Other Pair on Subjects’ 
Decision to Disclose in the RG-F treatment 
 
Dependent Variable: A dummy that equals 1 (0) if a subject i chooses to (not to) disclose her 
ID in period t 
Observations used in this analysis: i’s disclosure decision when two individuals in the other 
pair of i’s group both disclosed IDs in period t – 1 in the RG-F treatment 
 
     
 
When session clustering  
is not added 
When session clustering  
is added 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Observe-mutual-cooperation 
dummy#1 
.033** 
(.015) 
.025* 
(.015) 
.033 
(.037) 
.025 
(.035) 
     
Subject i’s period t – 1 disclosure 
decision {= 1 if i disclosed ID; and 
= 0 if i hid ID in period t – 1}  
.574*** 
(.024) 
.561*** 
(.024) 
.574 
(.108) 
.561 
(.103) 
     
Supergame Number {= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 
---- 
.011 
(.006) 
---- 
.011 
(.005) 
     
The length of the previous 
supergame  the Supergame 
Number > 1 dummy#2 
---- 
.001*** 
(.000) 
---- 
.001 
(.000) 
     
Constant .327*** .295*** .327 .295 
 (.023) (.027) (.119) (.129) 
     
# of Observations 1,144 1,144 1,144 1,144 
R-squared .727 .724 .727 .724 
     
 
Notes: Individual fixed effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session id. The numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors. 
#1 
The Observe-mutual-cooperation dummy variable equals 1 if among the two players with which subject i was not 
matched in period t – 1, both of the two players selected cooperation in that period; and 0 otherwise. 
#2 
The Supergame Number > 1 dummy equals 1 for the 2
nd
 to 5
th
 supergame; and 0 otherwise.   
 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
RESULT: Seeing two subjects in the other pair achieve mutual cooperation increases subjects’ 
likelihood to disclose in the following period by around three percent. However, this result is 
suggestive only because the effect is not significant once session clustering is added in the 
regressions.  
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Table A.12: The Impact of Observing Defection Targeted at a Non-discloser in the Other Pair 
on Subjects’ Decisions to Disclose in the RG-F treatment 
Dependent Variable: A dummy that equals 1 (0) if a subject i chooses to (not to) disclose her 
ID in period t 
Observations that satisfy the following conditions were used in this analysis: (a) Among two 
individuals k and s in the other pair in i’s group, one hid his/her ID, and the other disclosed ID 
in the last period (period t – 1); and (b) i and i’s interaction partner had an interaction outcome 
other than the one in which one subject hid his/her ID and the other subject disclosed but 
selected defection in period t – 1. 
 
   
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
   
   
Observe-nondisclosers-defected 
dummy#1 
-.046 
(.024) 
-.054 
(.020) 
   
Subject i’s period t – 1 disclosure 
decision {= 1 if i disclosed ID; and 
= 0 if i hid ID in period t – 1} 
.751** 
(.018) 
.732** 
(.024) 
   
Supergame Number {= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 
---- 
.020 
(.005) 
   
The length of the previous 
supergame  the Supergame 
Number > 1 dummy#2  
---- 
.001 
(.000) 
   
Constant .204** .158 
 (.005) (.011) 
   
# of Observations 570 570 
R-squared .730 .730 
   
 
Notes: Individual fixed effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session id. The numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors. 
#1 
The Observe-nondisclosers-defected dummy variable equals 1 if among the two players with which subject i was 
not matched in period t – 1, one person hid his/her ID while the other person disclosed his/her ID and selected 
defection in that period; and 0 otherwise. 
#2 
The Supergame Number > 1 dummy equals 1 for the 2
nd
 to 5
th
 supergame; and 0 otherwise.   
 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
RESULT: Seeing a non-discloser defected by his or her matched discloser in the other pair little 
affects subjects’ decisions to disclose in the following period. 
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Table A.13: The Difference in Non-disclosers’ Response to the Disclosers’ Intentions to 
Cooperate between the RP-F and RG-F Treatments 
 
Dependent Variable: A dummy that equals 1 (0) if a period t – 1 non-discloser i chooses to (not 
to) disclose her ID in period t 
Observations used in the regression: when subject i hid his/her ID but the matched partner 
disclosed and selected cooperation in period t – 1 (the previous period). 
   
Independent Variable (1) (2) 
   
   
The RG-F treatment dummy {= 1 for the 
RG-F treatment; and = 0 otherwise} 
.145** 
(.067) 
.161** 
(.074) 
   
Supergame Number {= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 
---- 
.037 
(.040) 
   
The length of the previous supergame  
the Supergame Number > 1 dummy  
---- 
.001 
(.003) 
   
Constant .157** .048 
 (.067) (.086) 
   
# of Observations 265 265 
R-squared .013 .005 
   
 
Notes: Individual random effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session id. The numbers 
in parentheses are standard errors. The Supergame Number > 1 dummy equals 1 for the 2
nd
 to 5
th
 supergame; and 0 
otherwise.   
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Appendix B: Instructions 
 
B.1: The RP treatment (no-choice treatment) 
The following are the instructions for the RP treatment.
1
  
 
Instructions 
You are now taking part in a decision-making experiment. Depending on your decisions and the decisions 
of other participants, you will be able to earn money in addition to the $5 guaranteed for your 
participation. Please read the following instructions carefully. 
During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a 
question, raise your hand. One of us will come to answer your question. In the experiment, you are given 
a fixed identification number. Your identification number stays the same during the entire experiment. 
You are not allowed to reveal it to any other participants in the experiment. 
During the experiment, your earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, points 
will be converted to U.S. dollars at the following rate: 
10 points = 13 cents. 
At the end of the experiment, your total earnings (including the $5 for participation) will be paid out to 
you in cash. 
There are 5 phases in the experiment. In each phase, all participants are randomly divided into groups of 
4 individuals. This means that you are in a group with 3 other participants and play with them in that 
phase. You will be part of the same group in 1 phase only. Once a phase is over, you will be randomly 
assigned to another group with 3 other new participants. You will never interact with the same set of 3 
participants in the following phases. Each phase consists of multiple periods. You will interact with your 
3 group members in each period. You will not interact with participants outside your group in each period.  
No one knows which other participants are in their group, and no one will be informed who was in which 
group after the experiment. The following sections first explain the details of each period in a phase. We 
then explain the duration of each phase. 
 
                                                          
1
 The ztree files in our study were programmed by amending the program files used in Casari and Camera 
(https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.3.979). 
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Your decision in each phase: 
In each period, you will be randomly paired with an individual in your group. You will be informed of the 
identification number of your partner. Your partner will also be informed of the identification number of 
you. The pairing is completely random. Neither your decisions in previous periods in this phase nor your 
decisions in previous phases affect the pairing process. Since there are 4 individuals in your group, the 
probability that you will be matched with the same individual in 2 consecutive periods of a given phase is 
1/3. In each period, you and your partner simultaneously choose Y or Z. There are 4 possible interaction 
outcomes: 
(a) If you choose Y and your counterpart also chooses Y, you earn 25 points.  
(b) If you choose Z and your counterpart also chooses Z, you earn 10 points.  
(c) If you choose Y and your counterpart chooses Z, you earn 5 points.  
(d) If you choose Z and your counterpart chooses Y, you earn 30 points.  
 
Your partner has the same earnings consequences as you. Once all participants in a session make 
decisions and click the “Submit” button, you are informed of the outcome of your interaction. Specifically, 
you will be informed of (1) your partner’s choice and (2) your earnings in this period. 
An Example of Computer Screen 1: (when making decisions)  
 
Note: Period 3. Decisions here are for illustration only. 
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An Example of Computer Screen 2: (the outcome screen)  
 
Note: Period 2. Decisions here are for illustration only. 
 
Your past decisions and interaction outcomes are displayed along with your partners’ identification 
numbers in a table (named “Summary of Results”) at the bottom of your computer screen as shown in the 
screen image (see Computer screen 2 above). As in the screen shots, you will not be informed of the 
decisions of the two participants that are not paired with you in each period. Your decisions in any 
periods are also known to your matched partners. By contrast, your decisions are not observed by the two 
other participants that are not paired with you in those periods. 
The Number of Periods in Each Phase: 
The number of periods is not predetermined. The probability that you will have another period is 95%. 
Operationally, at the end of each period, the computer randomly draws an integer between 1 and 100 for 
this session. The drawn integer will be displayed on the computer screen along with your interaction 
outcome of the present period (see Computer Screen 2 above). If the drawn integer is less than or equal to 
95, you will move on to the next round, and you will randomly be paired with an individual in your group. 
If it is greater than 95, then the present phase is over. You will move on to the next phase and will interact 
with 3 different, randomly selected individuals from today’s participants. The nature of interactions in the 
next phase is exactly the same as the present one. Note that your newly assigned 3 group members are 
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those who have never interacted with you in previous phases. You will never interact with a participant 
for more than 1 phase. 
Since the probability that you have the next period is 95%, the expected length of a phase is 20 periods. 
However, since the decision to discontinue is randomly exerted by the computer, you may have a phase 
with periods that are much longer than 20. Likewise, you might have a phase with periods that are much 
shorter than 20. 
Your Earnings: 
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid in cash, based on your accumulated earnings across the 
five phases. The conversion rate is 10 points = 13 cents. 
The structure of each phase is identical. If you have any questions at this time, please raise your hand. 
When all questions have been answered, we will move on to the experiment. 
Comprehension questions: 
Please answer the following questions to check your understanding of the instructions. Please raise your 
hand if you have any questions.  
 
1. How many phases do you have?    ___________________ 
 
2. How many individuals are there in your group in a given phase ?   ___________________ 
 
3. Suppose that you choose Y and your partner chooses Z in a period of a given phase. What are your 
earnings? What are your partner’s earnings? 
 
a) How much do you earn? ___________________ 
 
b) How much does your partner earn? ___________________ 
 
c) Who are informed of your choice of Y in this phase? 
36 
 
   i. Your current period partner only 
  ii. All three other persons in your group 
  iii. All participants in today’s experiment 
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B.2: The RP-C treatment (choice treatment) 
The following are the instructions for the RP-C treatment.  
 
Instructions 
 
You are now taking part in a decision-making experiment. Depending on your decisions and the decisions 
of other participants, you will be able to earn money in addition to the $5 guaranteed for your 
participation. Please read the following instructions carefully. 
During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a 
question, raise your hand. One of us will come to answer your question. In the experiment, you are given 
a fixed identification number. Your identification number stays the same during the entire experiment.  
During the experiment, your earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, points 
will be converted to U.S. dollars at the following rate: 
10 points = 13 cents. 
At the end of the experiment, your total earnings (including the $5 for participation) will be paid out to 
you in cash. 
There are 5 phases in the experiment. In each phase, all participants are randomly divided into groups of 
4 individuals. This means that you are in a group with 3 other participants and play with them in that 
phase. You will be part of the same group in 1 phase only. Once a phase is over, you will be randomly 
assigned to another group with 3 other new participants. You will never interact with the same set of 3 
participants in the following phases. Each phase consists of multiple periods. You will interact with your 
3 group members in each period. You will not interact with participants outside your group in each period.  
No one knows which other participants are in their group, and no one will be informed who was in which 
group after the experiment. The following sections first explain the details of each period in a phase. We 
then explain the duration of each phase. 
Your decision in each phase: 
In each period, you will be randomly paired with an individual in your group. The pairing is completely 
random. Neither your decisions in previous periods in this phase nor your decisions in previous phases 
affect the pairing process. Since there are 4 individuals in your group, the probability that you will be 
matched with the same individual in 2 consecutive periods of a given phase is 1/3. Your first decision in 
each period is whether to use your identification number in your interaction with your matched 
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partner, or to hide it which costs you 2 points. If you decide to use your assigned identification number, 
your matched partner will be informed of your identification number before your interaction with him or 
her. By contrast, if you decide to hide it, your earnings will be deducted by 2 points, but your matched 
partner will not know your identification number; he or she only knows that he or she is matched with 1 
of the 3 individuals in the group. Likewise, your partner makes the same decision regarding his or her 
identification number as you do. You will be informed of the identification number of your partner if your 
partner decides to use and show his or her identification number to you. If your partner decides not to use 
(decides to hide) his or her identification number by paying 2 points, then you will only know that you are 
randomly matched with 1 of the 3 individuals in your group.  
Once both you and your partner make decisions concerning the use of identification numbers, you and 
your partner simultaneously make choices of either Y or Z. There are 4 possible interaction outcomes: 
(e) If you choose Y and your counterpart also chooses Y, you earn 25 points.  
(f) If you choose Z and your counterpart also chooses Z, you earn 10 points.  
(g) If you choose Y and your counterpart chooses Z, you earn 5 points.  
(h) If you choose Z and your counterpart chooses Y, you earn 30 points.  
Your partner has the same earnings consequences as you. Once all participants in a session make 
decisions and click the “Submit” button, you are informed of the outcome of your interaction. Specifically, 
you will be informed of (1) your partner’s choice and (2) your earnings in this period, along with your 
partner’s identification number in case your partner has chosen to use and show his or her assigned 
identification number in this interaction. If you have chosen to use your identification number, your 
partner will also be informed of your identification number along with the outcome. 
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An Example of Computer Screen 1: (when making decisions)  
 
Note: Period 4. Decisions here are for illustration only. 
An Example of Computer Screen 2: (the outcome screen)  
 
Note: Period 4. Decisions here are for illustration only. 
Your past decisions and interaction outcomes are displayed along with your partners’ identification 
numbers (if used) in a table (named “Summary of Results”) at the bottom of your computer screen as 
A table containing history 
This period’s outcome will be added. 
 In periods 2, your partner used her IDs in the 
transaction with you. Therefore, you (ID 20) learn 
the identification numbers of this matched 
partner, along with their decision. 
 In periods 1 and 3, your partner did not 
use his or her ID. Therefore, you (ID 20) 
don’t know the identification number of 
your period 1 and period 3 partners. 
 In period 4, your partner used his or her 
ID. Therefore, you (ID 20) are informed 
of the identification number of your 
current partner. 
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shown in the screen image (see Computer screen 2 above). As in the screen shots, you will not be 
informed of the decisions of the 2 participants that are not paired with you in each period. Likewise, your 
decisions are not known by the 2 other participants that are not paired with you in those periods. But, your 
decision in a period is known to your matched partner, along with your identification number, if you 
decided to use your identification number in that period. By contrast, your decision in a period is not 
revealed to your matched partner if you decided to hide your identification number in that period by 
expending 2 points.  
The Number of Periods in Each Phase: 
The number of periods is not predetermined. The probability that you will have another period is 95%. 
Operationally, at the end of each period, the computer randomly draws an integer between 1 and 100 for 
this session. The drawn integer will be displayed on the computer screen along with your interaction 
outcome of the present period (see Computer Screen 2 above). If the drawn integer is less than or equal to 
95, you will move on to the next round, and you will randomly be paired with an individual in your group. 
If it is greater than 95, then the present phase is over. You will move on to the next phase and will interact 
with 3 different, randomly selected individuals from today’s participants. The nature of interactions in the 
next phase is exactly the same as the present one. Note that your newly assigned 3 group members are 
those who have never interacted with you in previous phases. You will never interact with a participant 
for more than 1 phase. 
Since the probability that you have the next period is 95%, the expected length of a phase is 20 periods. 
However, since the decision to discontinue is randomly exerted by the computer, you may have a phase 
with periods that are much longer than 20. Likewise, you might have a phase with periods that are much 
shorter than 20. 
Your Earnings: 
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid in cash, based on your accumulated earnings across the 
five phases. The conversion rate is 10 points = 13 cents. 
The structure of each phase is identical. If you have any questions at this time, please raise your hand. 
When all questions have been answered, we will move on to the experiment. 
 
Comprehension questions: 
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Please answer the following questions to check your understanding of the instructions. Please raise your 
hand if you have any questions.  
 
1. How many phases do you have?    ___________________ 
 
2. How many individuals are there in your group in a given phase ?   ___________________ 
 
3. How much does it cost you to hide your identification number in a period?    
___________________ 
 
4. Suppose that you have decided to show your identification number while your partner has decided to 
hide his or her identification number to you. Suppose that you choose Y and your partner chooses Z in a 
period of a given phase. What are your earnings? What are your partner’s earnings? 
 
a) How much do you earn? ___________________ 
 
b) How much does your partner earn? ___________________ 
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B.3: The RG-F treatment (choice treatment) 
The following are the instructions for the RG-F treatment.  
 
Instructions 
 
You are now taking part in a decision-making experiment. Depending on your decisions and the decisions 
of other participants, you will be able to earn money in addition to the $5 guaranteed for your 
participation. Please read the following instructions carefully. 
During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a 
question, raise your hand. One of us will come to answer your question. In the experiment, you are given 
a fixed identification number. Your identification number stays the same during the entire experiment.  
During the experiment, your earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, points 
will be converted to U.S. dollars at the following rate: 
10 points = 13 cents. 
At the end of the experiment, your total earnings (including the $5 for participation) will be paid out to 
you in cash. 
There are 5 phases in the experiment. In each phase, all participants are randomly divided into groups of 
4 individuals. This means that you are in a group with 3 other participants and play with them in that 
phase. You will be part of the same group in 1 phase only. Once a phase is over, you will be randomly 
assigned to another group with 3 other new participants. You will never interact with the same set of 3 
participants in the following phases. Each phase consists of multiple periods. You will interact with your 
3 group members in each period. You will not interact with participants outside your group in each period.  
No one knows which other participants are in their group, and no one will be informed who was in which 
group after the experiment. The following sections first explain the details of each period in a phase. We 
then explain the duration of each phase. 
Your decision in each phase: 
In each period, you will be randomly paired with an individual in your group. The pairing is completely 
random. Neither your decisions in previous periods in this phase nor your decisions in previous phases 
affect the pairing process. Since there are 4 individuals in your group, the probability that you will be 
matched with the same individual in 2 consecutive periods of a given phase is 1/3. Your first decision in 
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each period is whether to use your identification number in your transaction with your matched 
partner and the 2 other individuals in your group or hide it. The cost of hiding it is free of charge. If 
you decide to use your identification number, your matched partner will be informed of the identification 
number of you. By contrast, if you decide to hide it, your matched partner will not know your 
identification number; he or she will only know that he or she is matched with 1 of the 3 individuals in the 
group. Likewise, your partner makes the same decision regarding his or her identification number as you 
do. You will be informed of the identification number of your partner if your partner decides to use his or 
her identification number to you. If your partner decides not to use (decides to hide) his or her 
identification number, then you will only know that you are randomly matched with 1 of the 3 individuals 
in your group.  
Once both you and your partner make decisions concerning the use of identification numbers, you and 
your partner simultaneously make choices of either Y or Z. There are 4 possible interaction outcomes: 
(a) If you choose Y and your counterpart also chooses Y, you earn 25 points.  
(b) If you choose Z and your counterpart also chooses Z, you earn 10 points.  
(c) If you choose Y and your counterpart chooses Z, you earn 5 points.  
(d) If you choose Z and your counterpart chooses Y, you earn 30 points.  
 
Your partner has the same earnings consequences as you. Once all participants in a session make 
decisions and click the “Submit” button, you are informed of the outcome of your interaction. Specifically, 
you will be informed of (1) your partner’s choice and (2) your earnings in this period, along with your 
partner’s identification number in case your partner has chosen to use and show his or her assigned 
identification number in this interaction. You will also be informed of (3) the choice of other individual(s) 
in your group and (4) their identification number(s) if they have decided to use and show their 
identification number(s) to your group. If you have chosen to use your identification number, your partner 
will also be informed of your identification number; also, the 2 individuals that are not matched with you 
learn your choice and your identification number. 
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An Example of Computer Screen 1: (when making decisions)  
 
Note: Period 4. Decisions here are for illustration only. 
An Example of Computer Screen 2: (the outcome screen)  
 
Note: Period 4. Decisions here are for illustration only. 
A table containing history 
This period’s outcome will be added. 
The subject whose ID is 1 (not your partner) used and showed his or her 
ID  in periods 2 and 3; so, you are informed of his or her decisions. 
Subject whose ID is 15 is not your period 4 partner; but, since 
he or she used his or her ID, you learn his or her choice. 
 In period 2, your partner did not use his 
or her ID. Therefore, you (ID 12) do not 
know the identification number of your 
period 2 partner. 
 In periods 1 and 3, your partners used their IDs. 
Therefore, you (ID 12) learn the identification 
numbers of these 2 matched partners, along with 
their decisions. 
 In period 4, your partner used and 
showed his or her ID. Therefore, you 
(ID 12) know the identification number 
of your current partner. 
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Your past decisions and interaction outcomes are displayed along with your partners’ identification 
numbers (if used) in a table (named “Summary of Results”) at the bottom of your computer screen as 
shown in the screen image (see Computer screen 2 above). As in the screen shots, you will also be 
informed of the decisions of a participant that is not paired in a period with you if he or she has decided to 
use and show his or her ID in that period. Likewise, your decision in a period is known to your matched 
partner and the 2 other group members, along with your identification number, if you have chosen to use 
and show your identification number in that period. By contrast, your decision in a period is not shown to 
your matched partner or the 2 other participants that are not paired with you if you decided not to use your 
identification number in that period.  
The Number of Periods in Each Phase: 
The number of periods is not predetermined. The probability that you will have another period is 95%. 
Operationally, at the end of each period, the computer randomly draws an integer between 1 and 100 for 
this session. The drawn integer will be displayed on the computer screen along with your interaction 
outcome of the present period (see Computer Screen 2 above). If the drawn integer is less than or equal to 
95, you will move on to the next round, and you will randomly be paired with an individual in your group. 
If it is greater than 95, then the present phase is over. You will move on to the next phase and will interact 
with 3 different, randomly selected individuals from today’s participants. The nature of interactions in the 
next phase is exactly the same as the present one. Note that your newly assigned 3 group members are 
those who have never interacted with you in previous phases. You will never interact with a participant 
for more than 1 phase. 
Since the probability that you have the next period is 95%, the expected length of a phase is 20 periods. 
However, since the decision to discontinue is randomly exerted by the computer, you may have a phase 
with periods that are much longer than 20. Likewise, you might have a phase with periods that are much 
shorter than 20. 
Your Earnings: 
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid in cash, based on your accumulated earnings across the 
five phases. The conversion rate is 10 points = 13 cents. 
The structure of each phase is identical. If you have any questions at this time, please raise your hand. 
When all questions have been answered, we will move on to the experiment. 
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Comprehension questions: 
Please answer the following questions to check your understanding of the instructions. Please raise your 
hand if you have any questions.  
 
1. How many phases do you have?    ___________________ 
 
2. How many individuals are there in your group in a given phase ?   ___________________ 
 
3. How much does it cost you to hide your identification number to your partner in a period?    
___________________ 
 
4. Suppose that you decide to use and show your identification number in a period. Who learns your 
choice (either Y or Z) along with your identification number? 
  i. Nobody 
  ii. Your current period partner only 
  iii. All 3 other persons in your group 
  iv. All participants in today’s experiment 
 
5. Suppose that you choose Y and your partner chooses Z in a period of a given phase. What are your 
earnings? What are your partner’s earnings? 
 
a) How much do you earn? ___________________ 
 
b) How much does your partner earn? ___________________ 
